A People Awakens: Towards the National Liberation of Iraq

The following is written exclusively for Right Truth by Albrecht Gero Muth, former Special Adviser to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in Iraq, advising the Hoyatoleslam Moqtadir al-Sadar. I welcome your comments after you have read his article:

A People Awakens: Towards the National Liberation of Iraq

By Albrecht Gero Muth,

Najaf. 10 April 2007. The Day of National Awakening has come and gone, having met its objective to advance the cause of Iraq’s national liberation from “foreign occupation.” Najaf is awash in Iraqi flags. It’s a joyous feel all around, as a sense of liberation permeates the people’s sense of self. A new spring to be discovered in many an old Iraqi’s walk about town. As events will continue to unfold, a Nation is reborn. As a Nation, borne out of the struggle against foreign domination, one would hope that Americans of good-will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Iraqis, as they commence their Freedom Struggle this spring.

It may, perhaps, prove a portent of a new cooperative spirit, yet to emerge, that yesterday’s popular demonstrations coincide with the announcement by the Department of Defense that the Arkansas, Indiana, Ohio and Oklahoma National Guard have been put on notice to expect orders to deploy to Iraq. Iraq’s militiamen can well empathize with America’s organized militia, the National Guard. Not unlike the American citizen-soldier, it is Iraq’s citizen-soldier who will have to bear the brunt of the battle’s burden.

Ever since the first militia regiments were formed at Jamestown in 1607, the National Guard has stood eternal watch in defense of the American Spirit. Nowhere is the contribution of the National Guard to the advance of democracy and freedom more discernible than in Iraq where, on the battlefields from the open plains around Basra, to the greening tips of the Ninneveh plateau, America’s citizen-soldier stands his ground. Comprising almost half the Armed Forces Combat Support Force structure, the war in Iraq could not be won without the Army and Air National Guard. As in wars past, they will meet their rendez-vous with destiny.

I remain optimistic that, with the goodwill generated these past two months permitted to grow, the momentum gained can be transformed into victory.

Into victory in Baghdad.

Into victory in Iraq. And, beyond.

I remain personally committed to the goal of helping the United States Army achieve an early victory in Baghdad, with the objective of subsequent re-deployment out of a position of post-victory and strength. I am not greatly concerned about failure in Baghdad, or even in Iraq. The United States can readily adapt and the fallout inherent may even prove beneficial to the long-term U.S. national interest. I am, however, concerned, about the potential adverse fallout, should the United States Army be perceived as having failed in Iraq. That could invite serious miscalculations on the part of a more serious adversary in the future.

Within this context, the statement by the head of the Sadrist Parliamentary bloc, whereby Iraq shall be liberated in time for next year’s celebration, is of added import. A critical statement, which came through only in the last hours, prior to the march. It provides further indication for time frame JAM/Sadrists are working under. It sets out one year for the U.S. Army to make the President’s work. In that, it also sets a date final for JAM’s cooperation in advance of common cause.

The objectives, set forth by the President, publicly, can be achieved in the 12-month time-frame, NOW under consideration by both sides. There is further potential for a convergence of views on the role, which a united democratic Iraq, at peace with self and her neighbors can play as an ally on the War on Terrorism. One would hope that the “vision for Iraq,” i.e. the political AND religious principles, which are to govern the new and democratic Iraq, touched-upon at the neighbors meeting in Baghdad on 10 March 2007, can be further expanded upon in the working group, which is scheduled to convene later this month, and which is charged to prepare relevant language for next month’s Ministerial meeting. Within this context, active and constructive involvement on the part of the United States Government will prove essential.

Yesterday marked the first time, since the launch of the Baghdad Security Plan on 14 February 2007, that JAM was visible in the streets in force. One may want to remember the fresh faces of Iraq’s youth marching from Kufa to Najaf. They dispensed themselves with honor and dignity. As the New York Times has rightly noted, the “extraordinary discipline” was awe inspiring.

As Iraq looks for ways to integrate those elements of the various militias, willing to join the democratic process, into the Iraqi Army, the American experience of transforming America’s militias and integrating them into a uniform forces structure provides an important example. Just as, in replacing the old Militia Act of 1792, the 1903 Dick Act thrust the federal government into the picture by establishing procedures for a more direct and active role in organizing, training and equipping the National Guard in line with the standards established for the regular Army, so an inspired Iraqi political leadership will have to advance an organized militia, (National Guard) with an organization, pay, discipline and equipment of the National Guard to be the same as that of the Regular Iraqi Army. Towards that end, I am delighted to note that exploration is under way into the feasibility/ desirability for the Ministry of Defense to create a Division of Militia Affairs.

The objective of Najaf was to demonstrate relevance, religious, political and military, with the goal of positioning JAM/ Sadrists within the Battle for Baghdad, the War in Iraq and beyond. This objective has been met, in furtherance of the National Movement for the Liberation of Iraq.

The message to the PM and the Government of the Day has been noted. Al-Sadr’s popular support does not rest on his continued participation in government. To the contrary, as it is Sadr, who is in the lead in calling for withdrawal of all foreign forces from Iraq, there may be benefit to be derived by separating from government.

As has been noted the message inherent for Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. One may assume that the Hoyatoleslam’s hand viv-a-vis the Grand Ayatollahs has been strengthened. The challenge to the establishment has been manifested.

Confusion abounds about the Hoyatoleslam’s statement of 8 April 2007. There is nothing in the statement, which calls for violence to be inflicted on U.S. military personnel. I would not be part of it! To the contrary, the word in the Arabic original calls on JAM “to confront,” “not to attack.” A distinction with difference of critical import.

The wording was very carefully chosen. The statement expands on the statement of 25 February 2007 and must be seen integral to the Hoyatoleslam’s efforts to position himself within the nascent Movement for the National Liberation of Iraq from foreign occupation.

As of this hour, the order to JAM to stand down, not to attack Iraqi and U.S. military and security personnel, stands confirmed. (The order to JAM, not to return fire, even where fired upon, first, has been rescinded.)

As of this hour, the order to JAM to cooperate with the PM’s security plan for Baghdad stands confirmed.

As of this hour, the order to JAM to help assure the security, safety and well-being of U.S. military personnel, deployed alongside Iraqi military and security personnel in Sadr City, stands confirmed. (Dinawiya and Najaf being outside the perimeter of current cooperation.)

The Hoyatoleslam Moqtadir al-Sadar remains committed to continue to engage, constructively. Towards that end, he will continue to be guided by “clarity in action, ambiguity of language.” One would hope for the critics to take a careful look at the actions, constructive confidence-and-security-building measures, JAM/ Sadrists have taken, since the President announced the surge. These actions do, indeed, speak louder than words, however, at times, of necessity, confusing they may prove to some. The closer the level of cooperation on the ground, the stronger the need to deflect.

The Hoyatoleslam Moqtadir al-Sadar continues to support the Baghdad Security Plan, (military track) with the goal of restoring law and order to the streets of Iraq’s Capital city, in furtherance of the timely withdrawal of all foreign forces from Iraq, regular and irregular, parallel to a process for national reconciliation, (political track) which takes account of Shia unity in advance of Shia empowerment, political and economic, and which acknowledges the constructive role the religious plays in the public sphere of the new and democratic Iraq.

The argument can be made, and is beginning to be made, that the Hoyatoleslam has very little to show for his effort to engage the United States, constructively. Cooperative measures will, over time, have to become more reciprocal, in order to prove sustainable. There is added concern over the true purpose of the surge. Is the true purpose of the surge, as we were made to believe, and on which I sold the Hoyatoleslam, to redress the security situation as a precondition to advance national reconciliation, and thus a pre-requisite for withdrawal, or, is the true purpose of the surge just a rose to provide the U.S. the basis to get ever deeper into Iraq?

True purpose of the surge, duration and size of surge could become points of departure. It is essential for the Ministerial to deflect these concerns by advancing the synergies inherent in the issues referenced, e.g. the constructive parallelism between non-interference by outside powers/ withdrawal of all foreign forces, restoration of public order/ sovereignty and self-governance.

Further points for departure are continued efforts to undercut Shia unity and empowerment and an inability of the parties to the national reconciliation process to reach agreement on what is now called the "vision for Iraq.” One would hope that the actions to be taken by the parties to the process will help redress that impression.

Just as it is necessary to keep the political and military tracks in tandem, so it is imperative to keep the external and internal tracks in tandem. Towards that end, the next rounds of the national reconciliation process, in follow-on to the national reconciliation forum held in Baghdad on 10 December 2006, will be important: in advancing the synergies inherent in restoration of public order and restoration of sovereignty./ self-governance, as well as national reconciliation and national liberation from foreign occupation/ non-interference by outside powers/ forces.

(((Albrecht Gero Muth is a former Special Adviser to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in Iraq, advising the Hoyatoleslam Moqtadir al-Sadar. Mr. Muth is believed to be a key architect of the JAM/ Sadrist battle plan.)))

What do you think?

Comments

[Stormwarning]

And thus begins the emergence of Sadr as the "father of the democracy" that would be Iraq.

The question of defining victory in Iraq has been argued here recently. I believe that I defined it as a stable government. Others, I believe, asked for more including being "nice to their neighbors." The outcome remains to be seen.

But Sadr may be emerging as the eventual leader of Iraq. Like it or not, unintended consequence or not, Iraq will likely become a cleric-led Muslim state. Call it a democracy if you wish, but an unintended consequence nonetheless. The "people" will have spoken.