The Baghdad Security Plan at the 90-Day Marker

The following is a Right Truth exclusive, written by ALBRECHT GERO MUTH.

MEMORANDUM, 9 May 2007

SUBJECT: The BSP at the 90-Day Marker

HERE: A Sadrist/ JAM Perspective (UNOFFICIAL)

CAVEAT: As we approach the 90-Day Marker in the BSP, I thought, I would give some pointers. While personal in nature, I may, however, point out that they do, to a degree, reflect the Hoyatoleslam’s ever emerging views. Yet, the views expressed are not unanimously shared among Sadrist and JAM leaders and, therefore, do not, at this time, constitute official thinking. An official Sadrist position on success versus failure of BSP, concomitant to which a decision will be taken in. re the steps to be taken, next, will emanate sometime following our internal review in late summer. Usually referenced as August 14 (+/-), i.e. the six-month-point.

To assess preliminary success versus failure of BSP, 90-days-in, presupposes an assessment of advance of objectives and goals, as stated at the time; an assessment of both strategy and implementation modalities, chosen in advance of those objectives and goals; and an assessment of where things stand now versus then.

* One will remember that the declared objective of the surge is to improve the Baghdad security situation, with the goal of providing an opening for the Iraqi Government to advance national reconciliation.

I like to think that even a perfunctory look at the casualty lists, both American and, above all, Iraqi civilians, the one the West so easily overlooks, bears out the statement that Iraq’s security situation is not improving. While the point can be made that the number of individual attacks is down, as are sectarian killings, it is a point lost on Iraq’s civilian population now that fewer attacks kill in ever greater numbers.

Civic life in Baghdad has not come back. The security situation is not improving, but ever deteriorating, as now, for the first time, the Green Zone, itself, has come under near constant attack. A point, perhaps, not fully appreciated, until after the first major attack on Camp Victory. The last oasis of respite for the “conqueror,” if you will. Meanwhile, you will note, following JAM’s talks with the Turkish Army, the security situation in Northern Iraq will be permitted to deteriorate, adding pressures on Barzani to recall the Kurdish battalions from Baghdad, adding pressures on USA.

The reach of the Iraqi Government does not extend far outside the Green Zone. Its decrees prove altogether irrelevant in the provinces.

Moreover, there is no national reconciliation. There is, at this time, not even a national reconciliation process. There is no follow-up, let alone follow-on to the national reconciliation forum, which was held at Baghdad, 10 December. One would hope that once the draft Oil Law, aka Lex Khalilzad will have been buried by the Iraqi Parliament at the end of May, it may, perhaps be sinking in.

The political and military tracks, internal to Iraq, are on parallel tracks.

I continue to hold that the approach taken to advance national reconciliation, i.e. talking about/ rather than to insurgents and militias, apart from my firm position that reconciliation comes at the far-end of conflagration, underscores two flaws in the approach taken.

* One will remember that the PM’s dual track framework called for a national reconciliation process, internal to Iraq, to be helped along by an international/ regional conference of relevant outside powers, external to Iraq, aka the neighbors meeting.

I like to think that even a perfunctory look at Sharm el-Sheik underscores that the external track is dead-in-the water. Not only for manifesting the ever-widening Sunni versus Shia rift. Manifested, again, by lack of agreement on a substantive Communique, which would advance clear objectives, goals and time-lines. Off course, those advocating time-lines on one track, while opposing time-lines on the other track, do, ipso facto, undercut the advance of time-lines in either.

The internal and external tracks, envisioned by both the PM and the President, are on parallel tracks.

* One will remember that, from the beginning, I stated that “the surge will be greater in numbers and longer in duration, than led on at the time.”

I like to think that with the surge now up to 30,000, with an additional 35,000 now readied for call-up,--- it remaining to be seen whether to replace troops already deployed, or to augment,--- and General Petraeus now positioning the Army to extend the surge into spring ’08 (as I had indicated), the point stands confirmed that the military conduct is no longer independent of WH political needs.

One will further remember that the surge was to be gradual, with an assessment to be made, on a monthly basis, as to whether the Iraqis were meeting any of the famous benchmarks. And General Petraeus said, he would give an honest accounting, and the President stated, he would revisit the issue of the surge on a continuing basis in light of ongoing overall performance evaluations.

Well, none of the benchmarks have been met. The surge continues. I like to think I have made my point.

Let’s, for example look, at the Iraqi battalions. None are at full-strength, only half are operational and even fewer actually do any soldiering. To put it mildly, to say otherwise, is a misrepresentation of fact.

* One will remember my statements, at the time, i.e. that JAM, on direct order of the Hoyatoeslam, would stand down and cooperate with the BSP, in furtherance of improving the Iraqi security situation, upon which is contingent the timely withdrawal from Iraq of all foreign forces, regular and irregular, in furtherance of the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and territorial integrity.

I like to believe that the entente cordiale between JAM and the U.S. Army in advance of BSP, in furtherance of the larger objectives and goals referenced, is the one modicum of success to report on. You will note that in a mere three months JAM has been replaced by AQ/M as America’s Number One enemy in Iraq. And that is good for us.

Sadr City is a beacon of stability in a sea of chaos. Wherever JAM is permitted to do its thing, alongside USA, progress is being made. And it remains to be seen how long that can be sustained. For while U.S. appreciation for JAM/ Sadrist patience is recognized and, in turn reciprocally appreciated, continued attacks on the Shia faithful, the near total disintegration of governance at the centre of the Iraqi body politic and continuing question as to purpose, strength and duration of the surge, i.e. our red lines, will, in time, make it difficult for the Hoyatoleslam to remain on the sidelines.

Meanwhile, we will continue to be guided by “clarity in action, ambiguity in language.” The Hoyatoleslam’s ambivalence on the need for a continued U.S. forces presence ahs been expanded on. In keeping with Sun, one will remember, to win, over time, the conqueror must be successful, the conquered need just not fail. Within this context, I reference the FOOD FOR THOUGHT PAPER of 6 March 2007, which sets forth the outlines of the JAM/ Sadrist Battle Plan. The Hoyatoleslam is pleased with the progress being made, as the movement keeps growing, in political, economic and military terms. The money going into Sadr City is considerable, and no one wants to do anything to drain the well too soon. It is amusing to note that there are those who honestly believe that a million here, a million there buys political patronage absent an overall understanding/ if short of an agreement on the principles, political and religious, which are to govern the New Iraq, aka referenced at the “vision.”

In toto, at the three-months point the picture is mixed. Nonetheless, I remain optimistic and remain fully committed to a timely victory for the U.S. Army. I like to believe that, in due time, the entente cordiale with the U.S. Army can be expanded upon beyond Baghdad to the provinces. And that, eventually, the military cooperation will expand to a political dialogue. But that may have to await formation of the new Government. Which will come about, the day al-Maliki has outlived his usefulness as the face, behind which all parties tend to hide.

(Signed) ALBRECHT GERO MUTH

I look forward to reader comments on this article.

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Comments

[Albrecht Gero Muth]

Dear Mr. Melbert:

Victory in Iraq is defined, to paraphraze the President, by a democratic, unified Iraq, at peace with self and her neighbors, which assures fundamental human rights and civil liberties, as enshrined in the Iraqi Bill of Rights, part of the Iraqi Constitution.

I like to believe that on that road of Iraqi self-discovery, considerable progress has been made. For today, among Arab States, Iraq stands alone in being governed by a duly-constituted Government, borne out of open, free elections by the People of Iraq.

What we are, this date, witnessing in Iraq are as much the growing pains of an emerging democracy, as it is the struggle inherent in Shia empowerment. With the legtimate claims of Iraq's Shia faithful to govern their own affairs being challenged by forces, both inetrnal and external to Iraq.

The People of Iraq must come together within the (in)famous national reconciliation process, we all keep talking about. But, which remains a figment of the political imaginary mind. For that process, even at its conceptual level, contineus to fail to appreciate the need to address the fundamental issues inherent in the need for agreement on the political AND religious principles, wich are to govern the New Iraq. And those fundamental issues pivot around the role of the religious in Iarq's public sphere. By which is not, certainly not in the veiw of teh Hoyatoleslam Moqtadir al-Sadar's view, envisioned a theocracy a la Iran. But a return of Shia Iraq to the fundamentals of the faith. In that, Shia fundamentalists and Christian fundamentalists find themselves on the same side of teh secualr versus non-secular divide.

National reconciliation presupposes hard and serious collective bargaining with all parties to the conflict. All parties to Iraq's civil conflict must be invited to the table, presupposing their willingness to lay down their arms, in furtherance of their integration into the political process. An amnesty, general and broad in scope, must be available to all Iraqi nationals, militia and insurgent alike.

National reconciliation emanates at the far-end of conflagration, when either the ranks of the combatants have been decimated, or the combatants and their leaders realize the futility of armed conflict in advance of political objectives.

Everything must be done to help hasten that realization, integral to the emerging Movement for the National Liberation of Iraq from Foreign Occupation.

Will Iraq prove a Jeffersonian Democracy. Hardly. Will the streets of Baghdad be as safe as those of Boston. Hardly.

But an Iarqi Democracy somewhere between the traditions set by Turkey and Pakistan would be a sucess.

A security environment somewhere along the lines of Tel Aviv or Moscow would be a success.

That would be the living legacy of teh American War effort and teh sacrifice of the American people.

(Signed) Albrecht Gero Muth
Baghdad
10 May 2007

[Debbie]

James S. Melbert, thank you for visiting and commenting. As you can see, this article was written by Mr. Muth, who is in theatre and working with parties involved for a peaceful Iraq. The comments are all his.

However, in answering your question as to how we will know that we have "won", I received the following from Mr. Muth this morning. It helps to define victory.

Mr. Muth said:

At this time, Iraq is the sole Arab country with a duly-constituted Government, constituted on the basis of the free-will exercise of a free people.

Iraq also stands alone in having a Bill of Rights, granting fundamental human rights and civil liberties.

Both unheard of in the Arab world.

That is success of the American effort.

Does that mean Iraq is now, or will soon become, a Jeffersonian democracy. Certainly not. But a democracy somewhere between the taditions of Turkey and Pakistan. I like to think so.

Security. Iraq will have to come to learn with a security situation somewhere between Tel Aviv, Istanbul or Karachi. Car bombs will be an element of Iraqi street life for years to come. Can it be contained? Can we get the civilian population to learn to live with a sense of security in that environment. Still unfolding.

Again, many thanks,

ALBRECHT GERO MUTH

So my personal answer to you on what it means to win in Iraq, would be a democratic nation that can govern itself, defend itself with the help of other countries if necessary, so that the majority of Americans can come home.

I hope and pray for that in the near future. Is it possible, yes. But only if the Iraqi people really want it and only if the Iraqi people stand up. That includes the government.

I good news this week, many tribal sheiks have joined together, signing agreements, to fight against al-Qaeda. I think it will come down to the "tribes" working things out, which will lead to, or force, the government to shape up.

[James S> Melbert]

You said: "I remain optimistic and remain fully committed to a timely victory for the U.S. Army."
Perhaps you would be so kind as to define exactly what you mean by "victory". How will we recognize that we have "victory" in hand?
So far in this fiasco, no one has been able to tell me how we will know that we have "won". Can you do that?