IRAQ SITUATION INTERIM REPORT - Right Truth Exclusive Direct From Iraq

The following Iraq Situation Interim Report is posted here at Right Truth EXCLUSIVELY, for the purpose of round-table discussions between readers of Right Truth, politicians, military commanders, and any concerned about the situation in Iraq.  Written by Albrecht Gero Muth (Wikipedia). 

All comments and questions will be answered here at Right Truth by Mr. Muth:

Appended below the IRAQ SITUATION INTERIM REPORT, an internal document of the JAM Political-Military Affairs and Special Operations Command, written by Shaikh Ali Al-Mutahaba (aka Albrecht Gero Muth) and addressed to the Hoyatoleslam Moqtadir al-Sadar. Mr. Muith ......

Headquarters
JAM Political-Military Affairs and Special Operations Command
Sadr City, BAGDAD, Al Iraq
The Senior Commander
4 Rajab 1428/ 19 July 2007

IRAQ SITUATION INTERIM REPORT:

In the name of Allah, the Omnipotent, May an abundance of Heavenly Blessings shine upon You, Now as Always. This I say unto Thee, My Brother, in the Name of Muhammad, the Prophet, and Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of God. Long Live the Struggle. God be With Us.

The New Way Forward, Revisited 

This report is the first in a series of two internal JAM-PMA reports, submitted to the Hoyatoleslam Moqtadir al-Sadar, integral to ongoing internal JAM/ Sadrist deliberations on the JAM/ Sadrist Battle Plan: Grand Strategy, Military and Political, set forth in the Food for Thought Paper of 6 March 2007. It includes an assessment of progress being made in advance of Sadrist military and political objectives, in furtherance of the early restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and self-governance. And provides variable options for an adjustment to the Battle Plan, due by 1 September 2007.

Introduction

Overview

Stalemate, inertia and a general feeling of malaise, accentuated by a lack of cooperation, political will and competence, permeates all segments of Iraqi political life, with the people watching military and political developments unfold and for who comes out on top. Without a captain at the helm and rudderless, Iraq is a ship adrift in the Arabian Sea, about to founder. A deteriorating internal security situation, on top of eroding public confidence in the political leadership of the Iraqi government, concomitant to a perceived lessening of the international community's long-term political commitment are feeding on each other. These trends would have to be reversed to transform the political-social environment for the Battle for Baghdad to succeed. At this stage, it is unlikely that either the Government of Iraq, nor the United States Government will, on their own, have the capacity, intent and time to do so. As I stated on 6 March 2007:[1] “The al-Maliki government ever more perceived as doing the U.S. bidding, while security plan falters, will mark the end to the U.S. war effort in Iraq, as much as it will be the end to the al-Maliki government.”

In “Wooing the Insurgents,” UPI Outside View Commentary, United Press International, 29 November 2005, (!) I stated: “By all assessments, the U.S. Administration’s estimate of 18-24 months to build up Iraqi security forces, especially the police, to necessary levels of numbers and competency is unrealistic. Against that background enlisting nationalist elements of the insurgency into the domestic political process seems like the best hope to improve Iraq’s internal security situation and thence make possible the withdrawal of “all foreign forces and --- the ultimate goal--- the restoration of full sovereignty.”

Again, the Bush Administration is asking for an extension of the time to be given to build up Iraq’s Armed Forces and Security Forces. The time frame given in 2007 is as unrealistic as the one given in 2005. Given said lack of realism I delight in noting that the recommendation to enlist nationalist elements of the insurgency is being implemented. Let us augment the outreach to the Sunni insurgency with an outreach to Shia militias and move the New Way Forward, Revisited, forward, together. The dynamic inherent in a two-front approach to AQ/M and Iran should be seen as a means towards that end.

Popular support for the BSP is waning in both Iraq and the U.S. As the schedule pushes towards the 08 NDAA and Defense Appropriations Bills in the United States Congress, there is going to be more conditions language inserted, which will restrict the President’s room for maneuver. With the first primaries in the American Presidential election cycle in February, there will be some real showdowns in September, just as General Petraeus goes before the Congress. I expect the President to win this show-down, in the near-term. We should turn this showdown to our advantage. At the same time, BSP failure will continue to put added pressures on P.M. al-Maliki to step aside. Whether or not the P.M. will be able to survive, politically, will depend on an internal assessment by members of the governing coalition as to his continued utility. As our efforts within the Council of Representatives continue to gain momentum, these pressures should be increased, with the one permitted to feed off the other.

Overall, the Iraq Situation Interim Report provides for a negative picture in both, military and political terms. The functioning of the executive and legislative branches of the Iraqi central government is seriously impaired, with its authority not extending far beyond the Green Zone. None of the benchmarks, deemed critical to national accord, have been met, nor should they be expected to be met in the given time frame but, perhaps, for the Oil Law. Yet, even should a seriously-flawed Draft Oil Law be forced to pass to meet larger political objectives in the near-term, long-term implementation, already difficult to fathom, should be deemed even less realistic.

Iraq is in a state of war both, internal, e.g. civil, and external, e.g. intervention by outside powers. The security situation is deteriorating in Baghdad, where the Baghdad Security Plan fails to gain traction, and across country, where JAM’s dual encirclement strategy in the North and the South is forcing the U.S. Army to divert resources from the Capital, even before law and order has been restored. With Iran openly engaged in the South, Saudi Arabia clandestinely assisting Sunni insurgent groups, Syria aiding various illicit small arms and light weapons pipelines and Turkey engaged in cross-border shelling of PKK rebel hideouts in the Kurdistan Autonomous Region, major foreign powers are engaged in proxy warfare. If not yet the dying man of the ME, Iraq is bleeding.

The Iraq, you love, has ceased to exist. It will take an all-out, coordinated effort on all fronts, at all levels, for Iraqi patriots, across sectarian, ethnic and other divides, to hold Iraq together, under internal and external strains. As we have discussed, whatever course of action you opt to pursue in advance of the Struggle, the Revolution in advance of Shia Power, our direct action must be deemed Constitutional. The major historic lesson, I aim to impart, is for the Revolution from within. 

Civic life remains at a standstill, governmental services are not presently available to the people of Iraq. The faithful are under near daily assault from the dark forces of evil. The Government’s inability to provide adequate security for the holy pilgrimage to Samara has, yet again, demonstrated to all Iraqis that they cannot depend on their Government to provide security. No security, no political process. No political process, no security. These are key points to make. The day is approaching for JAM to assert its historic mission in defense of Iraq from enemies, domestic and foreign. We stand ready and shall await your orders.

The economy remains depressed; most public sector systems have collapsed. Short-term, that plays to advantage in our community outreach programmes. Long-term, separation from the Government, which restricts access for our people to key assets of the central government, will play to disadvantage and will hasten the need to re-think rejoining versus collapsing the government. Rejoining the Parliamentary bloc could provide us necessary breathing space. We could (co)-operate close to, but independent of Government, while further eroding it from within.

Internal displacement and refugee waves, comprising hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, are setting the stage for a major humanitarian crisis, yet to unfold, as the country’s human resources are being depleted. Ethnic cleansing, proceeding nearly unabated, short-term, should be expected to increase, integral to planning on the part of all parties to Iraq’s civil war for the “Day After.” (Target Date: 9 April 2009, “Iraq Liberation Day”) It is forcing a re-alignment of the country along ethnic lines which, together, with the regions asserting themselves over a weakening central government could, at the slightest provocation, lead to an implosion and partition of Iraq. Already, it will prove difficult to keep the Kurds integrated into post-Liberation Iraq. And, perhaps, even counter-productive to crafting a Shia-Arab Iraqi national identity. Within this context, thought should be given to the proposition to regain for Iraq in the East, what we may loose in the North. That would enable us to enlist the Kurds in Northern Iran in common cause to deconstruct the Iranian hegemon.

With Iraq’s civilian leadership crumbling, the Army unable to fill the void, time is approaching for a reluctant religious leadership to fill the void at the center of Iraqi governance. It remains to be seen whether the established religious leadership is up to the task at-hand. With Dr. Hakim seriously incapacitated, the burden of responsibility may well fall upon you. In the months, ahead, we must further manifest that you are the man in whose hands the future of Iraq may rest, as your position alone is propelled by broad-based cross-sectarian grass-roots support. This appeal must be further expanded upon. A fine line will have to be struck between keeping the other side guessing as to your intentions versus the need to enlist broad-based political support, internal and external to Iraq, in advance of a viable governing coalition at the core of a new National Salvation Government.

Section One: Holding On—the Political-Military Situation

I. The Military Situation

Baghdad Security Plan Progress Report

The BSP Progress Report is set forth in BSP, Progress Report, Memorandum of 4 June 2007, and the BSP at the 90-Day Marker, Memorandum of 9 May 2007. The assessments set forth in the two memoranda remain valid, as the situation has not improved, significantly. Nor, should it be expected to change, significantly, in the near-term. If not yet outright failed, the BSP is certainly failing to gain traction in advance of its stated objectives, as set forth by the American President on 10 January 2007: to take the necessary military measures in order to improve the security situation to the point of enabling the P.M. to advance the necessary political measures in order to further the process for national reconciliation.

The security situation has not improved, significantly. The small advances made may prove unsustainable over time. Public life has not been restored, as your recent tour of the South made clear. While sectarian killings were down for June, a drop, which was to be expected, but a point lost on the fear of violence on the part of the good citizens of Baghdad. Yet a positive development of potential significance, if it were to denote a sustainable and expanding trend. It is, for now, off set by the considerable increase in U.S. casualties. We should always express concern for U.S. casualties in Baghdad. You should make clear that you do not consider yourself at war with the American people, but at odds with the failed expansionist policies of a failed President. We must get rid of the anti-American stigma, which attaches to your name. Especially as I like to think that it does not reflect your attitude.

For the surge to work in shocking Iraqis into action it had to be swift, forceful and decisive. Yet, to date, less than two-thirds of Baghdad is covered by the BSP, the surge having taken too long to be deployed and operationalized. But for Sadr City, an oasis in a sea of chaos, which Jesus of Nazareth spoke of as a “shining city upon a hill,” Baghdad is a thunder. With U.S. forces levels, already, being thinned down to respond to a deteriorating security situation in the North, where JAM is helping the Turkish Army set the stage for a cross-border incursion into the Kurdish Autonomous Region, and the South, where an ongoing showdown between JAM and BADR is further eroding the U.K.’s tenuous hold on Basra. U.S. supply lines are over-extended and, as in evidence, the Army is running into added combat logistical issues. They will not be able to sustain the effort beyond the one year anniversary.

On the other hand, external to the geographic reach of the BSP, the security situation in Al-Anbar is improving in part, because of the U.S. Army enlisting the support of Sunni insurgents in common cause against Al-Qaeda Mesopotamia. An important development, undervalued in its potential signal impact, if it can be sustained and replicated. You are wise in encouraging this effort, further.

The military track continues to be shouldered almost exclusively by U.S.A. and is beginning to run into the sand of the Arabian Desert. None of the Iraqi battalions are full strength, only two-thirds are operational and even fewer actually do any soldiering. They lack training, equipment and competent command and control. To say nothing of commitment to the State. Which has come to me as a surprise. As you know, I have adjusted my earlier view on this one. The situation with regard to the Iraqi Police is even worse. The time frame given for training the Iraqi Army and Security Forces was and remains overly ambitious, bordering on the unrealistic. To say otherwise, is a misrepresentation of fact. The assessment given in my UPI outside view commentary of 29 November 2005 stands affirmed by the continued incompetence being displayed.

At the same time, I am happy to advise that Barzani is being forced to withdraw the Kurdish battalions for concern of being caught off guard by intensifying Turkish cross-border actions. I have briefed you on the actions, which are being taken by AQ/M. The less you know the better. We are in the process of implementing the course of action agreed upon with the Turkish Army and AQ/M, with the objective of further destabilizing the Northern security situation, to the point of a Turkish invasion. Our hand on this one will have to be played, most discreetly, as we must not be seen as collaborating with outside powers, interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq.

I have made it clear to the United States Government that short of a strategic decision, on their part, to engage you, personally, with the objective to enlist Shia militias in common cause, i.e. contra AQ/M and, possibly, Iran, I see little basis, on which to assume that the collapse of the U.S. effort can be avoided. I would hope that you do permit yourself to be engaged, personally. America is not defined by the singular actions of a single man. As I said in my statement to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 1 February 2007: [2]

“General Petraeus may have set himself up for defeat, given, inter alia, the manifest shortcomings in manpower, political will and time to see the plan through. The soldier/ per capita ratio is off, deployment falls short of what he called for, the window of opportunity is narrow. As a battle plan rarely survives first contact with the enemy, these constraints limit General Petraeus’s room for maneuver, adjustment. To work, all elements of the plan would have to come together, flawlessly, which presupposes a level of coordination/ cooperation with the Iraqis which, to date, has been found wanting. Moreover, the military outflanks the political, running the risk of proceeding independent thereof. Although, from a macro-theoretical perspective the Army’s new counter-insurgency manual, which the General helped write, is sound and will stand the test of history, in translating it into the war plan for the Battle for Baghdad, he may have failed to dissociate politics from strategy. Important the more, as counter-insurgency, house-to-house close-range big city combat, is not traditionally purview of the U.S. Army. Therefore, the Battle for Baghdad must be seen as a tactical gambit to regain the strategic initiative, a worthwhile albeit feasible gambit. But, a gambit. It must be appreciated as such.

Contrary to the President’s postulation, strategy and command are not, at this point, set apart from White House political needs. The informed observer, including an enemy whose recent actions have been noted to be marked by a new level of sophistication, (!) further realizes that the United States is confronting serious issues relating to capacity and intent to wage the war. While not yet a “political war,” the political and military components of the war effort run the risk of ending up on parallel tracks. It remains to be seen for how long, beyond the plan’s initial success, the Joint Chiefs and combatant commanders remain insulated from public criticism.”

It is said assessment, which informed your order to JAM to stand down and, with the underlying rationale remaining valid, continues to define said posture as the prudent course of action for us to take. Yet, the day is approaching that JAM will have to assert itself, alongside the Americans, if possible, alone, if necessary. The collapse of BSP will provide sufficient cover in this regard. The measures taken by us in Western Baghdad must be seen in this regard.

Since its original success in toppling the Devil, the war has taken on a dynamic of its own, well beyond its original intentions, because from the outset the U.S. pursued a flawed strategy due to erroneous assumptions and a lack of understanding of and appreciation for the operant dynamics of the Iraqi body politic. The way, in which the U.S. mishandled the dialogue with you, in my view, will be one for the history books. You are one in a succession of great leaders, over time, the Americans failed to catch on to.

Regrettably, erroneous assumptions and a lack of understanding of and appreciation for the operant dynamic of the Iraqi body politic continue to under gird the Administration’s conduct of the war as, yet again, manifest in the impending collapse of the BSP. Ignorance on top of incompetence, coupled with hubris is helping your cause.

“One of the main weaknesses in General Petraeus’ approach may lie in his dialectical method of presentation. Believing the political in follow-on to the military to form the basis on which to separate the populous from the insurgents, he seems to view war as neither “nothing but” a show of force nor “merely” a rational act of politics or policy. Given that in Iraq, however, the one tends to be a function of the other, could provide a conceptual flaw to be exploited by the other side.”[3]

That’s where your approach is inspired. As in advance of national reconciliation we “have two plans, the President’s and the P.M.’s which, for political purposes, are being advanced as mutually supportive, but which, depending upon what either side chooses to do next, can also be used to knock the other side off,”[4] the operant dynamic of Iraqi politics is aiding the JAM military strategy. To date, the President has not fully caught on to the fact that his surge strategy is not only failing because of its conceptual flaws, but also because of who he chose to align himself with in implementing it. 

II. The Political Situation

The Iraqi Central Government, under Prime Minister al-Maliki, is being eroded from both, within, e.g. the state of civil war, which exists between Iraq’s Shia majority and Sunni and Kurdish minorities and resultant political maneuverings internal to the governing coalition, as well as externally, e.g. the outside intervention/ proxy wars by Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The Iraqi Prime Minister’s proximity to a faltering American President, even where more perceived than real, further eroding the government’s slipping hold on power. Perception of that proximity should be enhanced at every opportunity. It will hasten the P.M’s demise.

To appreciate the uncertainties surrounding the Battle for Baghdad, one must appreciate the ambiguities, which characterize the relationship between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Iraq and, par consequent, the tenuous interaction between the United Stages Government and the Government of Iraq, marked by persistent questions about competence and integrity. These impressions should be fostered.

Both, Messrs. Bush and al-Maliki, are severely weakened, domestically and internationally. Core constituencies having parted, or threatening/ intending to part company. The conduct of the war, the lack of manifest progress, only further eroding popular support, as well as, heightening growing strains with the Parliamentary leadership and the military high command, as the day is approaching, where failure attaches to name and reputation. The sun setting, the shadows lengthening on their public service, the happen stance of history imposing a unity of purpose, even where strong differences in goals and modalities persist. It is ironic to note that the Prime Minister’s plan aimed to achieve exactly the opposite of the measures taken by the President, who has chosen to militarize the Prime Minister’s plan. And may, yet, want to militarize it further. At least, through spring 2008. The discreet planning for a “second surge,” camouflaged as troop rotation, must be seen in this regard, further accentuated by the possibility of an “all-out troop augmentation.” If they were able to find the troops, which, I am told, they can’t. Hence, to the informed, the P.M.’s lackluster support for the surge should not be surprising. We should further press the P.M. on a timeline, just to make sure that no-one is seriously considering long-term basing rights. We can play with definitions here both, in terms of concepts and timelines.

I think, it’s another example of your inspired leadership for you to get the Sunni Bloc to follow your lead in boycotting the cabinet. The combined enhanced bargaining position may just yield the desired results in forcing the P.M.’s hand on our agenda. I still don’t know how you did it. With the Sunni Bloc boycotting government, on top of our earlier walk out, the various alliances, on which depends the government’s viability to govern, are fracturing further. As more than a third of Ministerial posts are vacant and Parliament rarely able to reach a quorum, the ability of the al-Maliki government to govern is near non-existent. It is a government in nothing but name. A situation eroding the public’s trust and confidence in government, already shaken by the government’s inability to provide basic services to the people of Iraq. Points to accentuate on all fronts, at all levels.

Unable to govern, none of the significant benchmarks, the Americans have given, have been met. Not on Constitutional Reform. Not on Revenue-Sharing. Not on Provincial Elections. Not on Militias. Not on Amnesty. The list goes on. Secondary benchmarks which, for purpose of political camouflage, the President claims to have been met, at some level, are proving irrelevant in making a difference in terms of meeting intended objectives. The timid approach to national reconciliation has collapsed. There is no process, no follow-on to the December meeting. No effort to jumpstart the process. In a further sign of lessening expectations, some are talking of mere “accommodation.” As a result, the political track of the BSP will only further diverge from the military track, if one can even allow oneself to speak of a political track.

With the success of the BSP co-dependent on synchronization between its political and military tracks, the BSP should be expected to fall further behind in advance of its stated objectives, as a result of which the ability of the al-Maliki government to hold on to power will only further erode, as manifested by our efforts to effect a Parliamentary re-alignment, with the objective of forming a new government, including, and in particular, your efforts with Mr. al-Dulaimi. While I share the view that Mr. al-Hashemi makes a strong candidate for P.M., for reasons expanded upon, I hold that Dr. al-Hakim makes the more inspired candidate. He does not have that long to live, so you’ll get to fill that slot again, soon. Meanwhile, a move by you along these lines would be warmly received, especially among the younger leaders of the Supreme Council. It will also help Pupu play for time. In the interest of Shia unity, we should want to support him! It will enhance our hand with the Grand Ayatollah. Who better to force the Supreme Council to reciprocate your goodwill gesture? We must not permit ourselves to be outflanked on this front. It is with this in mind that I think we must, at least, be perceived to continue to engage the P.M. on willingness to re-join the Cabinet. Under no circumstance must we come across as obstructionist, let alone the ones going against the Grand Ayatollah. At least, not openly. We should continue to play participation in Parliament contra non-participation in the Cabinet. It’s with that in mind that I share Mr. al-Rubbaie’s recommendation for the Sadrist Bloc to rejoin Parliamentary proceedings, if alone short-term, for tactical advantage. That will enable us to co-opt, or compromise, whatever way you opt to go. Post-Najaf and Kufa the establishment is getting the message. They may not prove helpful, but they can no longer impede an unfolding historic trend. Especially one which serves Shia Revivalism and Shia Unity. 

The P.M.’s inability to fill the Ministerial posts left vacant by the Sadrist walkout, especially as we are now determined not to rejoin a faltering government, is manifestation of his deteriorating stature within the Iraqi body politic. A fine line must be walked between undercutting al-Maliki, while preserving the integrity of the central government at the apex of Iraqi governance. The unseating of al-Maliki with the help of the periphery must not come at the expense of the center. We do not want to find ourselves in a situation, where the end to al-Maliki marks the end to the central government and, by extension, the end to Iraq.

I appreciate that few may want to succeed him, for as long as the sustainability of the Parliamentary re-alignment under-way is not in evidence. On the other end, the point-in-time is approaching, where continued government stalemate, its short-term advantage notwithstanding, will play against us. There’s only so much politicking, even in times of war, no matter how discreet. At some point, you will have to enter the center stage, or self-relegate yourself to leading support cast. Your call.

I would like to impress this point upon you, especially within the context of the regions asserting themselves over the central government. While in your dealing with the P.M. short-term, stalemate may play to advantage, long-term it plays against your commitment to the continued territorial integrity of Iraq.

As the stalemate at the center of Iraqi governance is expected to persist under al-Maliki, the regions are asserting themselves at the expense of the central government, a development, which is eroding national unity. Openly supportive of early Provincial elections, which we reasonably can expect to win, I understand, we must clear the air between us and the Supreme Council in the South. I share your view that he who, following Provincial elections, ends up controlling the South will determine the future of Iraq as a unitary State. We must continue to push for Provincial elections by the end of the year.

The ongoing battlefield showdown between JAM and BADR must be brought to naught to set the stage for political talks between Sadrists and the Supreme Council, especially once Pupu has asserted his post-pere leadership.

Given the failures of the BSP in advancing its stated objectives, the continuing erosion of support for the President’s war effort is not surprising. This erosion should be expected to continue and will play to our advantage. While the President may, yet again, opt for some tactical adjustment, e.g. a “secondary surge” concomitant to troop rotation, through spring 2008, the hand-writing of failure is now being inked on the wall. In red! And yet, the President, if given the means, may even opt for an “all-out troop augmentation.” One must never under-estimate the cunning of a desperate leader, as the water is rising to the lower neck. I am, however, told that the troops, necessary to make a battlefield difference, are simply non-existent and that even current surge levels cannot be sustained through spring. As stated at the time of BSP inception, the window for success was and remains narrow: 180 days and counting.

The defections by senior Senators, who are members of his Party, should make the Congressional effort by Democrats to push for timelines for withdrawal the more credible. One should expect these efforts to be augmented by similar efforts on the Republican side. While an immediate pullout should not be expected, and certainly not on the President’s watch, nor, and we should make this clear, to we seek one, the Department of Defense advance planning calls for a “phased re-deployment,” first into safe areas, in part to monitor the situation, unfolding internal to Iraq, in part to help avert an outright humanitarian disaster, before being re-deployed out-of-country, while retaining a residual force, whose strength, configuration and mission remains vague. Our posture on re-deployment, short-term, should be marked by “constructive ambiguity.” 

Section Two: Your Position on BSP

“It is appreciated that you support the BSP, (military track) with the goal of restoring law and order to the streets of Iraq’s Capital city, in furtherance of the timely withdrawal/ redeployment of all foreign forces form Iraq, regular and irregular, parallel to a process for national reconciliation, (political track) which takes account of Shia unity in advance of Shia empowerment, political and economic, and which acknowledges the constructive role the religious plays in the public sphere of the New and democratic Iraq.”

I. Evolving Thinking 

With P,M. al-Maliki’s stock tanking, President Talabani incapacitated by illness, Dr. Hakim dying and senior Iraqi leaders in the process of making contingency plans for their families, you stand alone in having advanced your agenda and, in so doing, having advanced yourself. One will remember that, at BSP inception, there was a widely-held view that you would be targeted for arrest/ assassination and that JAM and U.S.A. would clash. Neither of which has happened. The transformation of JAM from America’s Number One Enemy in Iraq to being replaced in that category by AQ/M, to finding ourselves in an “entente cordiale” with U.S.A. in advance of BSP, to the point, where General Odierno is on record as seeking a personal meeting with you and where the American Vice President is contemplating the feasibility/ desirability of a “political arrangement,” illustrates one of the major developments this spring and summer. Developments you can be proud of.

1.) Moderation: With victory in-hand, it is incumbent upon us not to misstep. Nor to gloat. You must pursue the course for integration and unity. Jubilation on the part of your followers must be kept in check. Further thought should be given as to how to re-conceptualize the struggle as a fusion between Gandhi’s quest for liberation from the yoke of Colonial subjugation and Dr. King’s quest for civil rights, as well as acceptance of constructive nonviolence, as distinct from pacifism, as a means for social change, integral to the Movement for National Liberation from Foreign Occupation. I appreciate that, if alone to placate core constituencies, moderation must be balanced off against the need to display “revolutionary” zeal. There are limits to the extent to which you will be able to show yourself a moderate, publicly, while the struggle is in full bloom. I like to think that the level of “deniability” inherent in an “entente cordiale” will help maintain the integrity of your posture. 

2.) Re-Positioning JAM/ the Sadrist Movement and defining the relationship between the two. With JAM mapped and organized, uniform command and control structures having been instituted, and JAM being re-positioned as an “Army for Peace,” further thought will have to be given as to what to do with JAM, integral to the larger issue of militias, which will hit us, eventually. As disbanding JAM is out of the question, we may have to look at innovative approaches to “deactivation” vs. “decommissioning” vs. “demobilization.” A constructive ambiguity on language versus clarity on action may provide necessary room for maneuver. In the past, I mentioned the concept of “Construction Soldiers,” which my Uncle instituted in East Germany. The concept of “Neighborhood Watch” should also be explored.

It would be very helpful to learn your evolving thinking on the future of the Movement both, programmatically and organizationally/ operationally.

3.) JAM cooperation with BSP. We should let it be known that we are prepared to continue to cooperate, for as long as said cooperation continues to serve the national interest of Iraq. I do not believe that the signal inherent in the “No” to an alliance with Iran has been fully picked up.

4.) The JAM/ Sadrist Battle Plan must be revised to reflect the changing political-military situation on the ground. Although the “dual-encirclement strategy” will have to be sustained into the fall, how far do want to go in undercutting Barzani? If we do want to keep the Kurds within Iraq, then there are limits to our collaboration with Turkey contra Barzani, no matter how great the benefit in getting him to withdraw the battalions from Baghdad. I may want to have another talk with him, once the current round of direct measures will have run its course. 

Also, the “dual track framework” will have to be adjusted to reflect an emerging new reality. If we do think that it is necessary to assert Shia Iraq over Shia Iran then, perhaps, this should be done, sooner rather than later. On the diplomatic front, I am optimistic on the French in this regard. On the military side, thought should be given to a coordinated approach with the Americans. I am concerned that post-Iraq defeat or post-Bush, whatever comes first, the threshold for American action/ intervention may be raised so high as to preclude/ limited future action. In other words, if we do foresee potential benefit for us in an entente cordiale with the Americans contra Iran, it may be now, or not so soon, again. Common cause contra Iran and AQ/M is key to advancing JAM/ Sadrist cooperation with the United States.

5.) The Ninneveh process should be further evolved as an informal consultative process between Shia militia and Sunni insurgency leaders, with the objective of advancing common cause in restoring public order, as conducive to the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and self-governance. I continue to view the process as a major source of discreet influence for you. Also, it will ensure that the Americans not sidestep you in their dealings with the Sunni insurgency.

6.) It will continue to play to your advantage to define the Iraq Question between the Secular and the Non-Secular, with the Religious being advanced in defense/ advance of the Democratic. (see conclusion)

7.) The “Dialogue on Tolerance,” integral to the national reconciliation process, should be further evolved. Direct contact with Arun Gandhi should prove beneficial.

II. JAM/ Sadrist Game Plan

Defined by the programmatic set forth in the slogan: “Iraq Awakens: One People, One Country, One God”

II.1. The Agenda: How to reach what?

          National Accord

New Contract for All Iraqis: Majority Rule, Minority Rights

Land Reform, Nationalization of Key Industries, e.g. Oil         

Restoration of Sovereignty and Self-Governance (National Liberation)

          Shia Empowerment, political and economic (Liberation Theology)

Empowerment of the Lower Classes (Civil Rights)

Empowerment of the Religious, including an enhanced role for the Religious in the Public Sphere (Islamic Revival, Religious and/or Political?) (Shia-Sunni, Arab-Non-Arab, Church-State)

The implosion of Iraq, i.e. the de-construction of the atheist Baathist regime, can be viewed as a gain, in terms of “self-purification,” depending on costs involved. The destruction of the one to be viewed as a necessary pre-condition to enable the other to come to the fore. The Biblical “nature’s ebb and flow” adage may spring to mind, if I may insert this reference.

There are variable operant dynamics in play between restoration of public order, the timely withdrawal of all foreign forces, regular and irregular, non-interference by outside powers, the restoration of Iraqi self-governance and the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty. At Kufa, not unlike the Day of National Awakening celebrated at Najaf a month, earlier, you demonstrated to Iraq’s political and religious leadership that the Movement stands uniquely prepared to advance the one, in furtherance of the other. As I wrote in FURKONO on 21 November 2006: “A door of opportunity is being opened. For discreet efforts are underway, among Sunni and Shia militia leaders, and leaders of the foreign jihad, to explore vistas for cooperative measures in restoring self-governance to the people of Iraq. It is hoped that an emerging Movement for the National Liberation of Iraq will test the hypothesis that an Iraq, whole and free, is tenable as a stabilized unitary democratic state, at peace with herself and her neighbors.”

II.2. The Message:

Objective:    Message of Unity (Religious and Political)

Goals:          Message of Liberation (External)

                             Message of Empowerment (Internal)

Means:         Message of Tolerance

Message of Nonviolence

Message of Conciliation

II.3. Operational: To be advanced on two tracks.

II.3.a. Political: (Sadrist Movement)

II.3.a.1. Governmental:

Advance of Parliamentary Re-Alignment, with the goal of staging an insurrection, with the objective of forming a National Salvation Government. Talks underway with Sunnis and Kurds

Advance of Provincial Elections

Advance of Constitutional Reform (in advance of role of the Religious)

II.3.a.2. Nexus:

Advance of the National Reconciliation Process

Advance of Summit of Militia Leaders

II.3.a.3. Non-Governmental:

Advance of National Movement for Liberation

Advance of the National Movement for Empowerment

The pilgrimages to Najaf, Kufa and Samarra, to come, must be seen integral to the larger campaign to position Sadrists at the center of the two emerging extra-governmental movements, which feed on each other: liberation, external to Iraq, and empowerment, internal to Iraq.

Building on Najaf, Kufa provided the opening clarion call for the arduous work ahead, to advance national reconciliation in furtherance of national accord and national liberation. I note the preparations underway for Samarra. Again, we must underscore our regret over the continued absence of national accord and the Government’s inability to move the national reconciliation process forward. In further building upon the cross-sectarian appeal you are gaining, you must take the lead in filling the leadership void.[6] In advance of the Iraq Question, you must continue to advocate constructive nonviolence in advance of peaceful social change, including, inter alia, “peaceful demonstrations,” including “sit-ins,” and civil disobedience, staples of civil rights movements the world over.

II.3.b. Military: (JAM)

JAM/U.S.A. military cooperation in advance of BSP should continue, with Sadr City ever more “a shining city upon a hill,” an oasis in a sea of chaos all about. The public works project should be expedited.

Working on expanding the level of military cooperation beyond Baghdad, including, common cause against AQ/M and, possibly, Iran, should Iran persist to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq. Waiting on a possible political track. The feasibility/ desirability of a “political arrangement,” envisioned by the American Vice President, should be explored.

Your detailed proposition in this regard, with the objective of jumpstarting the process for national reconciliation, is set forth in my message, entitled: “Hoyatoleslam Moqtadir al-Sadar’s Willingness to Help Jumpstart the Process for the National Reconciliation of Iraq,” dated 24 May 2007, and addressed to the Honorable Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. As I state: “National accord comes at the far-end of an arduous process which, integral to reconciliation, reconciles those, hitherto operating outside the political process, into the political process. It cannot solely be advanced by those already operating within the political process. That means, direct approach must be made to Shia militias and Sunni insurgents. Militias and insurgents are being talked about, rather than talked to. That must change.”

Further, as I state in my message of 24 May 2007, addressed to the Honorable David Hannah, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs: “We are proposing to augment the level of military cooperation, already in play integral to BSP, with a political track, however informal, in advance of our common interests in Baghdad, Iraq, and beyond. In furtherance of common cause, we will do all, within our power, to help turn the BSP into a success, in time for GEN Petraeus’ statement to Congress in September. Such to be achieved by virtue of the Hoyatoleslam taking a lead in jumpstarting the process for national reconciliation on the basis of the points enumerated, notably Shia militia/ Sunni insurgent cooperation in advance of restoring law and order. This effort in advance of the political needs of the President and the new (Shia) Parliamentary majority.”

We are in the second 90-day phase of the Battle for Baghdad, “180 Days and Counting.” And the pressure will be kept up on all fronts, with the objective of getting the U.S. Army to offer to JAM to fill the void being left behind in Baghdad, as the new offensive against AQ/M gains traction. Within this regard, I have reminded the Americans of the constructive role being played by JAM. As I stated in my letter of 29 May 2007, addressed to General Peter Pace, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “To the contrary of evolving thinking, at this stage of public opinion going against the surge, a visible battlefield victory is needed. JAM stands ready to help make this happen in Baghdad, in furtherance of the BSP, with the objective of advancing the political objectives, expanded upon in detail. Towards that end, I continue to argue in favor of coordinated “direct measures” against “key targets.” The bulk of the violence, both insurgent and sectarian, continues to be inflicted by an identifiable cabal, which can be rendered “neutral.” And JAM Special Operations Units, augmented by some of the previous regime’s finest and cooperating with Iraqi Special Forces, stand uniquely prepared and willing to accomplish that objective. I like to think that last week’s operations against Revolutionary Guards Cells are further manifestation of what can be achieved along that path. Let’s shut down those IED factories.”

Offensive actions in the North and the South will be maintained at full force. JAM SpecOps will continue to be executed against elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, operating on Iraqi territory. As I have indicated, we have a fair assessment as to who is holding the captive Britons and are zeroing in on their location. The P.M. has been advised, accordingly.

Rapprochement between us and the Supreme Council, which will be resultant from the showdown between JAM and BADR in the South (Basra), is critical to your leadership role on the Shia side. Nouri thinks to be able to deliver a battlefield victory to you by fall. I tend to think he may be a bit optimistic on that, as he’s not only confronting BADR, but also the British Army and they seem intent on getting into the fight.

Advance of the Ninneveh process, in furtherance of cooperation between Shia militias and Sunni insurgency, will further enhance your hand vis-à-vis Dr. Hakim. The recent effort by the U.S. Army to cooperate with Sunni insurgents in al-Anbar and Diyala, a positive development of potentially strategic import, parallels this effort. We should discreetly support this effort, because it enhances our own effort in this regard. Yet, make it clear that the U.S. embrace of the Sunni insurgency cannot come at the exclusion of Shia militias, lest the U.S. be intent on being portrayed as choosing sides in Iraq’s internal strife.

It will be incumbent upon us to ensure that the non-paper of 25 October 2006, which was crafted jointly by Sunni and Shia leaders, including militia and insurgency leaders, remains at the center of our efforts to advance the operant dynamic between restoration of sovereignty and public order, national reconciliation and national liberation. 

Section Three: New Way Forward, Revisited

The American war effort, if not yet collapsing, can no longer be won. The United States, on its own, is in a no position to achieve the stated war objectives! As a result, the American President has indicated, privately, “a” willingness “to adjust” his war plan. We should expect this adjustment in fall/ winter, later rather than sooner, and should signal our preparedness to help him do so.

A lot will depend on the desirability/ feasibility of the yessable propositions, which are being advanced. He will gain the upper hand, who succeeds in advancing his own objectives in furtherance of the President’s objectives. A zero sum will prove untenable.

Within this regard, we should continue to help the U.S. Army achieve a tactical battlefield victory in advance of BSP to help the President gain breezing space, to make the necessary adjustments and to soften the blow of defeat. Our common objectives can be achieved in the 12-to-18 month time-frame, NOW under consideration. There is further potential for a convergence of views on the role, which a united democratic Iraq, at peace with self and her neighbors can play as an ally on the War on Terrorism. It should be underscored that the U.S. vision for the New Iraq and the Sadrist vision for the New Iraq are much closer in line than is appreciated. 

One would hope that the Americans will realize that the surge is failing to meet its stated military and political objectives and realize why it is failing. Further, one would hope for them to realize that these shortcomings both, military and political, cannot, in the near-term, be redressed to change the situation, strategically. That in order to avoid outright defeat the strategy must be adjusted to reflect the emerging military and political realities confronting the U.S. war effort, in theatre and at home. That lack of readily manifest victory in Iraq (tactical defeat) can, as yet, be turned into more strategic success in the larger picture, e.g. positioning Iraq alongside the United States in the larger War, including contra AQ/M and Iran. We should continue to advocate a battlefield adjustment of alliances, accordingly.

The Americans must be made to appreciate that although of import to winning the war in Iraq, success or failure in the Battle for Baghdad will not, on its own, prove decisive in changing the winds of war. The effort must be expanded to the provinces and that can only be accomplished, together, in cooperation with Shia militias and Sunni insurgency. As they have done throughout, America’s fighting sons and daughters may, as yet, achieve a tactical objective, i.e. to secure the capital, and that remains a questionable proposition, while failing to achieve the larger strategic objective, i.e. to secure the country. And that is not in question. Moreover, the battle’s significance to the war on terror(ism) is overdrawn, just as is inflated the threat perception emanating from failure. Even at this stage of the war its link to terror(ism) is, at best, tenuous. In short, U.S. military personnel are being asked to sacrifice on the certain, on the imponderable of the uncertain.

We should further make it clear that we fully support the calls for an end to sectarian killings, the disarmament of militias and an equitable distribution of oil-revenue, presupposing that

1.) the unique role of Iraq as the sole Arab State with a duly-constituted Government, constituted on the basis of the free-will exercise of a free people, be respected and appreciated;

2.) the fundamental human rights and civil liberties enshrined in the Iraqi “Bill of Rights,” integral part of the Iraqi Constitution, along with full recognition of majority rule and the role of the religious in Iraq’s public sphere be respected and appreciated;

3.) the constructive parallelism between non-interference by outside powers/ withdrawal of all foreign forces, regular and irregular, restoration of public order/ sovereignty and self-governance be respected and appreciated;

4.) the constructive role, played by the emerging Movement for the National Liberation of Iraq from Foreign Occupation, in advance of sub. para. 3, be respected;

5.) a cessation of hostilities be advanced, concomitant to the redeployment of U.S. forces, as both a precondition for and function of the fledgling process for national reconciliation, which must advance agreement on all principles, political and religious, which are to govern the new Iraq;

6.) an amnesty, general and blanket, be offered to all Iraqi nationals, willing to lay down their arms and to join the democratic political process;

7.) the Draft Oil Bill, pending before Parliament, be re-drafted to ensure ownership of Iraq’s oil reserves by the People.

Towards that end, our recommendations to adjust the strategy should be:

I. Demilitarize the strategy, adjusted: even though reconciliation comes at the far end of conflagration and the argument can be made that, perhaps, violence has, not yet, been at the level necessary to get people to their senses, lack of capacity and intent will make a sustainable military effort, aimed at helping facilitate a political solution, more unrealistic.

II. Reverse surge. Set deadlines for immediate re-deployment (within 180 days, i.e. spring 2008) and near-term withdrawal. (within 540 days, i.e. 9 April 2009) Replace departing troops with militias and insurgents, amenable to political compromise and re-configuration under government control either, at the level of the central government or the provincial level. Encourage recall of eligible soldiers of the Iraqi Army, in particular Specialized Republican Guard. A new effort should be made to enlist General Hamdani. I like to think that his rejection is softening.

III. Advance cross-sectarian political and militia/ insurgency cooperation in furtherance of common cause. (AQ/M/ Iran) (the two feeding on each other)

Advance the one as a condition and function of the other.

Work on both, the governmental and non-governmental levels. Fuse E Pluribus Unum and Divide et Impera.

III. 1. On the governmental level:

The future of Iraq rests with the people and Government of Iraq and with them alone. 

Influence/ support ongoing efforts aimed at Parliamentary re-alignment, with objective of forming a National Salvation Government, capable and willing to govern, to be led by a competent and willing Prime Minister, committed to the advance of National Accord both, programmatically and operationally. Help bring about a governing coalition, which has the benchmarks as an integral part of the coalition agreement. Discreetly influence the coalition agreement in line with overall objectives and goals. 

Support the creation of a Department for Militia Affairs within the Ministry for Defense, or creation of a Ministry for Militia Affairs

III. 2. On the non-governmental level:

Work on Shia Militias and Sunni Insurgency, with the near-term goal of enlisting their support in restoring public order, and the long-term objective of integrating them into the political process. Distinguish “enemy,” i.e. militias and insurgents, from the “foe,” e.g. AQ/M. Destroy the foe, while co-opting the enemy in furtherance of common tactical goals, i.e. defeating the foe, while keeping resolution to possible differences on strategic objectives, i.e. the vision for the New Iraq, in abeyance.[7] Give the enemy that, which he wants that you can live with, long-term, while obtaining that, which you need, short-term.

With that in mind:

JAM/ USA military cooperation should be expanded beyond BSP, with the military track to be augmented by a political dialogue between the Administration and the Sadrist political leadership. The President may want to dispatch a Special Envoy to meet with you, if only we can get you to receive him. Align JAM both with US military and political interests, presupposing that JAM can unite the Shia bloc and militias behind a functioning National Government, under a competent Prime Minister. Cooperation between JAM and BADR and Sadrists and the Supreme Council should be encouraged as a necessary corollary to enhanced JAM/USA cooperation, with the objective of advancing a united front of Shia militias, which should positively impact upon Sadrist/ Supreme Council Parliamentary cooperation.

This effort should be seen as building on the U.S. Army’s ongoing efforts with Sunni insurgents in al-Anbar and Diyala and is consistent with JAM’s own efforts, integral to the Ninneveh process, with the objective of expanding Shia militia cooperation to the Sunni insurgency. Further advance Shia/ Sunni political cooperation.

These efforts should be fused, in part, by offering a strong DD&R programme, which must be based on interlocking political and economic incentives to be available to former combatants, willing to lay down their arms, to join the political process and to abide by the national accord. Some should prove amenable to be incorporated into the Iraqi Army and Security Forces. Others could be re-configured as an Iraqi National Guard, to be organized along provincial lines. Others should be disbanded.

You should state, publicly, that we support the U.S. decision to cooperate with those nationalist elements of the Sunni insurgency, willing to join the democratic process and amenable to political compromise, as an extension of military cooperation, in place between JAM and the U.S. Army, in advance of the BSP, especially in restoring security to the streets of Sadr City. Furthermore, that the decision is seen as both a precondition for and function of widening the scope and deepening the level of JAM/ USA military cooperation, in Baghdad, throughout Iraq, and beyond.   

USA/ Sunni insurgent military cooperation marks an important step of potentially strategic import. We must assist this effort. It underscores the efficacy of the approach, which GEN Odierno and I discussed, i.e. the need to find “definitions” in order to differentiate between “extremists” vs. “terrorists,” and is manifestation of my adage that “extremists are outflanked at the far-end, not the near-end.”[8] 

General Odierno stated: “When we look at it from a United States perspective, it's about who threatens the United States. … I guess you have to get into the technical definitions between the two.  The bottom line is who threatens the safety of our citizens in the United States and as well as our allies, and we will deal with it based on that.”[9] An important point further expanded on by General Odierno on 7 January 2007, when he referred to the need for the Government of Iraq to devise a policy to redress the 20% of militias operating outside the law, implying that 80% of militias are within the law.

With the Government of Iraq failing the General, I am optimistic that a coordinated effort, on the part of the Combatant Commanders, to engage amenable elements of the Sunni insurgency and Shia militias, including JAM and Badr, in a common front to restore law and order in Iraq will provide a realistic basis for a battlefield victory. JAM stands ready. The meeting between JAM and USA Combatant Commanders went well and should be built upon. Further, the proposed meeting between Ambassador Crocker and the Sadrist Parliamentary leadership should proceed. The talks with BADR should be further advanced.

I believe my article, “Towards Reconciliation and Sovereignty: Iraqis Claim Their National destiny,” Furkono (Assyrian Liberation Party) 21 November 2006, remains valid in this regard:

“Today's militiaman, who will be Iraq's leader of tomorrow, must agree that Iraqis do not kill Iraqis. Renunciation of the use of violence is a mandatory pre-requisite for inclusion in a general and blanket amnesty to be afforded all Iraqis willing to lay down their arms and to join the democratic process.”

Lack of progress on amnesty is disappointing and proving not helpful. Amnesty is an important means, integral to DD&R. I would hope for reconsideration of this important point.

You and Dr. al-Hakim should follow through on cooperating on an interim cessation of violence, to be observed by Shia militias in the run-up to the national reconciliation conference. The Summit of Militia Leaders, under consideration, could prove an important catalyst towards that end. A successful conference, resultant in a follow-on process based on a goal-oriented Programme of Action, should help facilitate an indefinite extension.

At the same time, discreet efforts underway to enlist Sunni militias should be further encouraged, including the proposition for the Mujahedeen Shura Council to be invited, should all Iraqi members of the Council renounce violence and declare their preparedness to abide by the national accord. That would require a command decision at the level of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, including an instruction to Abu-Ayeeb al-Masri to seize operations and leave the country. Word is outstanding what, if any, premium Dr. Zawahiri is willing to pay for a political role within the Council for a de-militarized al-Qaeda Mesopotamia, re-constituted.

Enlisting nationalist elements of the militias and the insurgency into the domestic political process remains the best hope, short-term, to improve Iraq`s internal security situation and thence make possible the phased withdrawal of all foreign forces and -- the ultimate goal -- the restoration of full sovereignty.

The transformation of eligible militia and insurgency elements into Army National Guard should be given further thought.[10] As Iraq looks for ways to integrate those elements of the various militias, willing to join the democratic process, into the Iraqi Army, the American experience of transforming America’s militias and integrating them into a uniform forces structure provides an important example. Just as, in replacing the old Militia Act of 1792, the 1903 Dick Act thrust the federal government into the picture by establishing procedures for a more direct and active role in organizing, training and equipping the National Guard in line with the standards established for the regular Army, so an inspired Iraqi political leadership will have to advance an organized militia, (National Guard) with an organization, pay, discipline and equipment of the National Guard to be the same as that of the Regular Iraqi Army.

A re-alignment of Iraq along ethnic lines is well underway. It remains to be seen if anyone really has the will and ability to reverse a historic trend. The level of an Iraqi national identity is encouraging and could, as yet, forestall partition along ethnic and religious lines. On the other hand, the threat perception to emanate from Federalism seems overdrawn. A Federal structure could even prove useful in enabling the re-constituting of eligible elements of the militias as National Guard under primary regional command and control, but overall command and control of the Army Chief of Staff. I fully appreciate that you do not support the re-alignment of Iraq along Federal lines for fear that it proves to be the antecedent to partition. And you may prove right on this point. And yet, the emerging reality on the ground may prove a fait accomplish. Thought should be given to the desirability of a U.N. administered plebiscite.

Creative thinking will also have to be applied to what to do with AQ/M in the long-term. We are committed to confronting AQ/M head on and our cooperation in this regard, as in evidence in ongoing military operations, where we have, in part, provided actionable battlefield Intel to the Americans, may be counted on. And yet, I may assume that it is understood that, not unlike Shia militias and Sunni insurgency, AQ/M will not solely be defeated on the battlefield. I firmly believe that AQ/M must be engaged along lines similar to those, which warrant USA engagement of militias and insurgents. I fully appreciate that I do not have you with me on this one, but thank you for granting permission to explore the effort’s feasibility/ desirability. 

A wedge must be driven between those elements of AQ/M, who are Iraqi nationals versus those who are not. That could enable us to drive a wedge between AQ/M and AQ/Central, especially should an AQ/M, re-configured, be eligible for participation in the post-Liberation political process. Those members of AQ/M, nationals of Iraq, willing to lay down their arms and to join the democratic process, must be eligible for the general and blanket amnesty which, following national accord, will have to be available to all Iraqis. I do not see what fault line, other than Iraqi versus non-Iraqi, can be drawn, integral to the national reconciliation process, which you want to jumpstart. Would getting AQ/M to split from AQ/Central not constitute a strategic defeat for AQ/Central? And could this not help our juxtaposition in the larger war?

A few reflections on my dealings with AQ/M. I view the effort critical to advance of our larger strategic objectives. “Constructive engagement” of AQ is not only critical to the future of Iraq, but, AQ is also the Grand Prize in the War on Terror. Also, self-serving that it is, successful engagement of AQ/M by JAM would also provide ultimate proof of the validity of my assertion that extremists are outflanked at the far-end, not the near-end. Who better to sway an extremist than another extremist? I appreciate the fact that you do not view yourself in that camp.

It will prove critical to me to demonstrate to Abu-Ayeeb and Dr. Zawahiri the establishment’s amenability to post-Conflict integration of “reform extremists,” i.e. what are the benefits to be derived form “going political?” Does this not also apply to us? Abu Ayeeb tells me that they are under increasing pressures from forces, internal to AQ/M. There is a whole cadre of younger leaders vying for a leadership role on account of Dr. Zawahiri failing in advance of AQ objectives. I continue to hold that getting AQ/M to vacate Iraq should be viewed as a premium and that we should show flexibility in our approach towards that end. 

The proposition to AQ/M:

·        Cease the armed struggle against Shia Iraq, join the Movement for the National Liberation of Iraq from Foreign Occupation and let us, together, push the religious into the forefront of the public sphere of the New Iraq.

·        Members of AQ/M, who are Iraqi nationals, willing to lay down their arms and to join  the democratic process, (IRAQIS DO NOT KILL IRAQIS!) will be eligible for the general and blanket amnesty, to be accorded all Iraqi nationals, ex-post national reconciliation/ national accord.

·        Commit to the non-use of violence against civilians and commit not to engage the Infidel, at home. Our joint struggle is not against the Infidel, as much as it is against the wayward Sunni ruling elite. To the extent that the Infidel gets in the way by supporting a corrupt ruling elite, he is to be engaged, within theatre, not at home. Throwing bombs into bay carriages in European capitals runs counter the potential to be derived from cross-fertilization with our brothers over there.

·        A re-constituted AQ/M, as an integral part of the Mujahedeen Shura Council, or, perhaps, even on its own, will be eligible to join the democratic process of the post-Liberation New Iraq.

·        A possible role for AQ/M in advance of the religious within the Sunni tribal areas can be further explored, integral to the exploration of the principles, political and religious, which are to govern the New Iraq.

IV. Advance the Dual Track Framework

Reference to past efforts by former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in this regard would be deeply appreciated. You and I would not now be playing together, had it not been for the Busumuru. I still envision a role for him in all this, once the United Nations is back, fully engaged.

IV.1. Programmatically:

Support a “New Contract for All Iraqis:” to be based on Hope, Tolerance, Nonviolence, Conciliation and Unity.

Acknowledge the operant dynamic/ linkage between improved security, withdrawal of foreign forces, regular and irregular, non-interference by outside powers, restoration of sovereignty and self-governance.

It should be made clear to the Americans that, short-term, non-interference by outside powers, linked to the withdrawal of all foreign forces, regular and irregular, may prove the most realistic objective the U.S. can achieve.

IV.2. Operationally: Advance two processes:

IV.2.a. Internal to Iraq:

National Reconciliation Process: A National Reconciliation (All Party) Conference, to which all stakeholders in the Iraqi body politic are to be invited both, non-governmental and governmental, should be called for. To be preceded by the Summit of Militia and Insurgency Leaders. It is in fusing the two, where short-term, I seethe prospect for improving Iraq’s security situation.

An Eminent Persons Group, under the patronage of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, perhaps co-chaired by you Dr. al-Hakim or Jalal al-Deen al-Saghir from the Shia side and Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, Harith Sulayman al-Dhari or Mahmoud al-Sumaydai from the Sunni side, and with its members to be drawn from the political and religious leadership of all constituent groups of the Iraqi body politic subscribing to the national accord, including Christians, could help steer post-Conference follow-up and follow-on. I continue to hold that we should send a strong signal by getting Tariq Aziz released. He can prove an asset in your overall integrative efforts. 

The al-Maliki government’s approach to national reconciliation is wrong both, in conceptual and procedural terms. Within this context, I would like to set forth, again, three principles:

·  Extremists are outflanked on the far-end, not the near-end. The approach taken to enlist moderates to split extremists is erroneous. On the continuum of extremism you go out as far as you can, co-opt the one extremist at the far-end, amenable to your overtures, and work your way backward. Rather than, with the help of some moderate forward. The same rationale applies, which required Nixon to open-up to China, or Reagan to USSR. Couldn’t have been done by a moderate, could it?

·  Reconciliation comes at the far end of conflagration. At the point, when the parties to the conflict are either dead, or realize the futility of armed struggle in advance of political objectives. This, however, comes only at the far-end of exhaustion, or utter brutality. Or, granted, when the civilian population is turned. Neither of which is the case. Nor, do I expect it to be the case in the short time frame given. Yet, again, the surge, not unlike modern warfare in general, takes too timid an approach. With all due respect to General Petraeus, I think he errs on the soft approach to counter-insurgency. It’s carrots and sticks. Not just carrots.

·  Reconciliation takes place external to government, at the nexus of the non-governmental and governmental levels of action. The approach taken, whereby one thinks that some meaningless piece of legislation, even where it to be passed by Parliament, will help realign extremists is erroneous. What is needed is a process, external to government, in which extremists get to advance their political objectives, upon renunciation of violence, with the objective of their integration into the body politic. That is, certainly, the lesson of the African experience.   

To date, militias and insurgents are being talked about, rather than talked to. That must change. You should call for a Summit of Militia Leaders as a necessary antecedent to the national reconciliation conference. At the summit, militia and insurgent leaders should agree to an interim cessation of hostilities, with the objective of creating the political climate for conciliation, in which advance work on the agenda for the national reconciliation conference can proceed. Militia and insurgency should be enlisted to help enforce the interim ceasefire, with the objective of improving the overall security situation.

In particular, the summit should consider (1.) an immediate cessation of the armed struggle; (2.) the recall of eligible officers and soldiers of the Iraqi Army and Security Forces and their placement under competent Iraqi command to advance the phased redeployment of all foreign forces, regular and irregular; (3.) “the vision for the New Iraq,” i.e. the principles, political and religious, which are to govern the New Iraq, including and in particular, the role of the religious in Iraq’s public sphere; (4.) restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and self-governance, integral to the Movement for the National Liberation of Iraq from Foreign Occupation, in advance of the early withdrawal of all foreign forces from Iraqi territory, regular and irregular; (5.) Shia EMPOWERMENT on the basis of majority rule, with safeguards for minority rights; (6.) a general and blanket amnesty, available to ALL Iraqi nationals, willing to lay down their arms and to join the political process; (7.) a recall of eligible members of the Iraqi Civil Service.

I know that some of the proposed agenda items may prove difficult for you to fathom. But, the agenda must be all-inclusive. I rather have us have it out, before the National Salvation Government assumes government responsibility, rather than do it after assuming office. That’s where the National Unity Government erred.

The summit must be seen integral to the political track, in advance of the process for national reconciliation. In that, it builds on the variable operant dynamics at play between restoration of public order, self-governance, Iraqi sovereignty and national accord on the New and Democratic Iraq. In advance of national accord, which is envisioned to emanate at the far-end of the national reconciliation process, the national reconciliation conference must advance agreement on the principles, political and religious, which are to govern the New Iraq. All Iraqi citizens, willing to sign onto the national accord and to lay down their arms, shall be eligible for a general and blanket amnesty. Economic incentives, including pensions, integral to a multi-faceted Demobilziation, Decommisioning and Rehabilitation of militia and insurgent fighters will  have to be made available.

IV.2.b. External to Iraq:

An international conference in support of Iraq’s internal efforts, (!) and for said purpose alone, could be envisioned to address Iraq's juxtaposition within the Middle East, security assurances and economic development. The Compact, adjusted accordingly, may prove a viable venue. The sole purpose of the conference to augment the process, internal to Iraq. And yet, legitimate concerns of Iraq's neighbors could be addressed, perhaps better within the larger international framework, rather than merely within the regional. The Iraq Question must not be internationalized, but internalized. Iraq for the Iraqis. 

The conference would advance the operant dynamic/ linkage between withdrawal of all foreign forces, regular and irregular, and non-interference by outside powers, into which U.S. redeployment/ withdrawal can be absorbed. Getting Iran/ Syria to commit not to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq may be among the few long-term objectives, U.S. diplomacy can achieve, short-term. Within this context, the potential role of UN peacekeeping should be looked at further.

Your position on a continued presence of U.S. forces on Iraqi territory has repeatedly been expanded upon. We are known not to take issue with the general time frame. The Americans know that we do not seek an immediate withdrawal, but a phased re-deployment, pursuant to the evolving security situation. They also know that we do remain concerned about the notion of permanent bases. It is appreciated that we would not be in a position to express our support, openly. I hold that, in order to make defeat more palatable to the Americans, we must prove ourselves programmatic on this point.

A Contact Group, to be comprised of the UN, EU, OIC, Arab League, the P-5, relevant and interested powers, could be envisioned to help steer conference follow-up and follow-on.

An Eminent Persons Group internal to Iraq and a Contact Group external to Iraq could provide a chapeau for the dual-track framework, with the objective of helping advance maximum coordination and harmonization of security in all its aspects. If successful, the operant dynamic, inherent in the dual-track framework, could be considered for the convening of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME) to explore vistas, venues and modalities to address and redress the gamut of political-military, economic and social issues, confronting the issues. Such a bold initiative, however, would require willingness to proceed on Palestinian Statehood. I see great potential for post-Liberation Iraqi diplomacy on this one. There is, in advance of Iraq’s leading ME role, benefit to be derived from linking Iraq’s liberation struggle to the quest for Palestinian statehood. We should position Shia Iraq in the forefront of an awakening pan-Arab nationalism. The President’s initiative on an international peace conference, with the objective of bringing about a Palestinian State, should be seen in this regard. We should support the effort and aim to link it up to a larger ME Conference a la CSCME.

Conclusion: What is the Iraq Question?[11]

The Iraq Question is best defined by the principles, political and religious, which are to govern the New Iraq. What will be Iraq’s future between the secular and the religious? The answer to the one will provide guide and counsel to the other. With Iraq’s secular leadership crumbling, time has come for Iraq’s religious leadership to assert its legitimate role within the Iraqi body politic. And that means you. When, if not now, is it time to assert the Religious in advance of the Democratic? That, my Leader, is where I see the potential for you to leave a legacy of historic significance.

I believe we are getting ever closer to achieving our objectives. For the good news is that, prima face, the controversies are more political and secular than religious. That means they are susceptible to a negotiated political settlement. The religious part is being introduced to rally support, stiffen the resistance and provide an elevated platform for resistance and a jihadi framework for the pursuit of the political. Common cause and an alliance among the religious leaders across the East-West, Islamic-Christian, divide will further help move those political pieces of the insurgency/ militia closer to a resolution.

All this will take some time, but needs to be done. Without this kind of political movement, the military effort underway will not succeed, or in other words, the military is a necessary part of the equation, but not sufficient without the political agreement to see the process through to a conclusion.

The realization that the Iraq Question is driven by the quest of the disenfranchised for power, a quest which, as yet, could enable you to unite Shia, Sunni, Kurd and Christian in an “Alliance of Reason,” with the religious a means to advance the political, is critical in determining what course of action to pursue and, in my view, justifies the rationale for your ongoing cross-sectarian talks with the leadership of the insurgency and the militia on a political platform to be advanced integral to the Movement for the National Liberation of Iraq from Foreign Occupation. You should hasten the widening of these talks to include all of Iraq’s religious and ethnic minorities. 

Yet, while the liberation struggle is political and about power, one must not fail to appreciate that the ultima ratio is, as yet, religious in nature, i. e. to push the religious into the public sphere. As you are looking for an increased role for the religious in the public life of Iraq, there is a strong basis for common ground with religious fundamentalists the world over, all yearning to come out of under the yoke of an ill-guided secularism, which is destroying Christian faith-based societies, as much as it is destroying Islamic faith-based societies by advancing atheism and materialism at the expense of the divine. We should embrace Pope Benedict’s call for an “increased Christian role in the affairs of Europe” and, in so doing, stake out a claim for an increased Islamic role in the affairs of the Levant. Formal approach should be made to the Holy See. We should entertain a leading role for the Holy See in East-West Inter-Religious Dialogue. I appreciate that you do not appreciate the Holy Father’s inter-religious versus inter-faith dialogue. But like to think that we can work around it.

In asserting your leading role at the center of the Movement for the National Liberation of Iraq from Foreign Occupation in advance of National Reconciliation, you are at the apex of the Struggle both, the internal and the external struggle. In that, you are in a unique position to advance a National Accord on the principles, religious and political, which are to govern the New and Democratic Iraq. An Iraq of Iraqis and for Iraqis.

At Samarra, you should renew your call on Iraqis across the sectarian divide to assert their Iraqi national identity. Now that a “political arrangement” with you is considered an option by the occupier, perhaps, the signals being sent will compel a new look at the Sadrist Movement, its objectives and goals in advance of the New and Democratic Iraq.

Nothing shall now turn us around. Nor will anything be permitted to derail our efforts for peace. We will not now permit our detractors to divert us from the path of conciliation and peace. For not unlike U.S. President Abraham Lincoln, during another war, in another time, calling on his countrymen, so you should call on all Iraqis “to finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.”

(Signed) Shaikh Ali Al-Muthaba

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Albrecht Gero Muth, “Mehdi Army/ Sadrist Battle Plan, Grand Strategy, Political and Military,” Food for Thought Paper, 6 March 2007

[2] Albrecht Gero Muth, “East by East-West: “Enemy” versus “Foe” in the Iraq War,” Statement to the United States Committee on Foreign Relations, 1 February 2007

[3] Ditto.

[4] Ditto.

[5] Albrecht Gero Muth, “Wooing the Insurgents,” Outside View Commentary, United Press International, 29 November 2005

[6] Albrecht Gero Muth, “A People Awakens: Towards the National Liberation of Iraq,” Part Two, Article, Right Truth Exclusive, 25 May 2007

[7] Dr. George D. Schwab, “Enemy oder Foe: Der Konflikt der modernen Politik,” in Epirrhosis, Berlin, 1968, vol. II, “Enemy or Foe: A Conflict of Modern Politics,” TELOS, No. 72, Summer 1987

[8] Albrecht Gero Muth, “Wooing the Insurgents,” Outside View Commentary, United Press International, 29 November 2005

[9] General Raymond Odierno, USA, and Albrecht Gero Muth, AEI Transcripts, 18 January 2006

[10] Albrecht Gero Muth, “A People Awakens: Towards the National Liberation of Iraq,” Part One, Article, Right Truth Exclusive, 10 April 2007

[11] Albrecht Gero Muth, “The Iraq Question between Secularism and the Religious,” Article, Right Truth Exclusive, 30 May 2007

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Comments

[Debbie]

Thanks Snooper. I realize it's long and most people in the blogosphere don't want to take time to actually read a report like this. I'm glad you took the time.

While I don't agree with everything in the report, there is much truth here. We could learn much.

Our leaders both in Washington and in Baghdad will be receiving this report, or some version of it.

[Snooper]

Perhaps our dementedcrats should at LEAST read the very last paragraph.

Congrats on the exclusive!!

[Debbie]

Thanks Ernesto. I thought about you this week, with the terrible plane crash in Brazil. All those lives lost. So terrible.

[Ernesto Ribeiro]

WOW, Right Truth GETS AN EXCLUSIVE REPORT!

Good stike, Debbie. Things are getting hotter here. My congratulations.