Islamism, Terrorism and US Army Doctrine

By Mark Silinsky

    In order to understand fully the US Army’s responsibility to protect its soldiers against terrorism, it is important to understand doctrine, which is the official way of doing things. Usually, doctrine is a broad and recommended, as opposed to narrow and required, approach to a task. Sometimes doctrinal documents are helpful and clearly written guides.¹   But many other US Army doctrinal documents are turgid and, for many readers, arcane. For this reason, they are not often read outside of military and academic circles. But those who care about the Islamist threat to the US Army are well advised to understand the doctrinal elements of the US Army’s mission to combat terrorism.²

    There is counterterrorism (CT) doctrine and anti-terrorism (AT) in the Army.   CT activities are offensive and often dynamic, while AT measures are more defensive and do not involve the application of violence.³  For example, CT operations include the spectacular commando operation against bin Laden in Pakistan. AT efforts might include the drafting, vetting, and distribution of an Army-wide briefing on the Islamist threat to the US Army. AT activity also includes mundane measures involving securing gates, checking locks, positioning guards, etc. If these AT measures are less cinematic than CT measures, they are often equal in force protection importance.

    The US Army and Three Sources of Terrorism 

    According to United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), terrorism comes from at least three different sources.⁴    They are domestic terrorism, international terrorism, and extremist groups and organizations.

    a. Domestic terrorism is action “involving groups or individuals whose activities are directed at elements of our government or population without foreign direction.”⁵ 

    b. International terrorism is action “involving groups or individuals whose activities are foreign-based, and/or directed by countries or groups outside the U.S., or whose activities transcend national boundaries.”

    c. Extremist groups are organizations “that espouse supremacist causes, foster discrimination based on race, creed, color, gender, religion, or national origin, and advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights.”⁶ 

    TRADOC 525.13 and the Islamist Challenge

    How do the US Army doctrine 525.13 and AT measures relate to Islamism?  If domestic or international actors involve themselves in the “unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to coerce or intimidate a government or a society” they are, according to definition, terrorists.  According to Army doctrine, MAJ Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood killer, or SGT Hasan Akbar, the soldier who killed in Kuwait, were terrorists. They may have been insane, but they are nevertheless terrorists. They may have been economically deprived and socially alienated, but they were economically deprived and socially alienated terrorists. The point is, if Muslims use violence or threaten to use violence against the US Army they are terrorists. If they do on the basis of Islamic mandates, it is accurate, in the view of this author, to refer to them as Islamist terrorists.

    But another category under 525.13 is often overlooked, and it is the category of extremist groups.  This category is important because there are several Islamist groups that keep themselves “once-removed” from terrorists to give themselves the patina of legitimacy. These organizations do not openly advocate violence against the US Army or US Army personnel, and it is unlikely that they would be brazenly contemptuous of American liberalism.  Rather, front organizations of the Islamic Brotherhood offer a mask of moderation to avoid the impression of extremism, a stigma that would impede their high-level access to military and government leaders and might hinder their privilege seeking. Some, such as the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), have succeeded and today enjoy credibility among intellectual elites, law enforcement personnel, and, in some cases, the military.

   

 Figure 1 A CAIR Notice to Muslims

 

     These groups have relevance to AT. Notorious gunmen such as Hasan and Akbar command the headlines, but extremist groups deserve equal scrutiny. Has the US Army been sufficiently aggressive in warning the troops of Islamist extremist groups, such as CAIR?   US Army counterintelligence, by virtue of its mission, is always at war. But how effectively has it engaged the Janus-faced Islamist enemy that waves American flags while simultaneously promoting vicious, violent Koranic verses in mosques, schools, and on US Army posts?

 

Mark Silinsky is a senior counterintelligence analyst for the US Army. His views do not represent those of the US Army.  He is very interested in hearing from service members or national security personnel with similar concerns of Islamism in the military or US government.  He can be reached at Silinsky@yahoo.com. 

NOTES:

1  A fine example of this is the counterinsurgency doctrine, which was promulgated to wide acclaim several years ago. It was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize
 2  In the Army, “terrorism is characterized as the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to coerce or intimidate a government or a society.”
3  According to TRADOC Reg 525-13 the anti-terrorism and counterterrorism are determined by TRADOC. “This regulation prescribes responsibilities, policies, procedures, and minimum standards for developing, implementing, and managing a Force Protection Program (FPP). It is written with HQ TRADOC staff and installations in mind. Force Protection (FP) is the security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, within the TRADOC area of responsibility; at home station, during mobilization, during deployment, and in conjunction with overseas temporary duty or permanent change of station.”  Source:  Department of the Army, Headquarters, United States Army, Training and Doctrine Command, 12 December 1997.
4   Military Operations United States Army Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Force Protection Program (FPP)  Http://Www.Tradoc.Army.Mil/Tpubs/Regs/R525-13.htm
5  Military Operations United States Army Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Force Protection Program (FPP)  Http://Www.Tradoc.Army.Mil/Tpubs/Regs/R525-13.htm
6  Military Operations United States Army Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Force Protection Program (FPP)  Http://Www.Tradoc.Army.Mil/Tpubs/Regs/R525-13.htm
 

Comments

[R.J. Godlewski]

The Army has been corrupted by "ticket punchers" who have spent too much time in Washington.