Right Truth

Jim Stuteville’s Struggle in the Ring

By Mark Silinsky

       Terry Malloy: “If I spill, my life ain't worth a nickel.” Father Barry:” And how much is your soul worth if you don't?”

      Jim Stuteville, the senior-most civilian adviser in US Army on counterintelligence operations, testified before Congress on December 7, 2011 regarding the US Army’s response to homeland terrorism.¹  Some of us who worked with this Academy graduate² and enjoyed his upbeat persona and ever-willingness to help were disappointed.³ We hoped he would seize the high-profile occasion to signal a new and dynamic direction in identifying, engaging, and defeating the US Army’s enemy, which is Islamism, or political Islam.  Jim did no such thing. His performance was mechanical, overly rehearsed and, in my judgment, misleading. Seeking refuge in the bureaucratic arcana of Army regulations, his testimony was vapid. He probably didn’t perjure himself because he didn’t say anything, and high-level civil servants are rarely punished for that.

      But there was much Jim could have said, sitting before that elective body. It could have been his Terry Malloy moment.⁴ Yesterday’s boxer in a cushy union waterfront job, Terry Malloy comes clean in the fight of his life. This match pitted his dignity against his fear of being labeled a stoolie. His dignity won. And so did the honest longshoremen who worked and lived on the waterfront. Malloy’s testimony provided Congress necessary information to identify, engage, and defeat the enemies of honest, good men.

  Figure 1 In the Movie, Dignity Wins

      Jim Stuteville had his shot in the ring. In his 30-year career there may have been few greater opportunities for Jim to exhibit the ethics so prized by his alma mater. West Pointers speak of devotion to “duty, honor, county,” and for many soldiers these words form the core of their character. Jim Stuteville could have performed his duty by exposing the sclerosis and omerta in the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), which has so shackled efforts to identify, engage, and defeat the Islamist enemy. Was it not his duty to explain that analysts in the Army’s counterintelligence Center (ACIC) have pleaded with its director Claude “Bud” Benner for years to build an Army-wide, robust, and Islamist-specific counterintelligence program? Was it not his duty to disclose the climate of fear in the 902^nd Military Intelligence Group that hushes talk on Islamist issues?

      As for honor, Jim Stuteville could have honored the 13 dead of Fort Hood and other murdered US soldiers with candor and a promise to begin a good fight against Islamists who have killed our soldiers, infiltrated our chaplaincy, and so effectively muzzled analysts and operators in Army counterintelligence. That would have been the honorable thing to do.

Figure 2  Jim Stuteville Had a Shot in the Ring

      Finally there is country.  If counterintelligence leaders like Jim Stuteville do not take risks defending their country who will? These risks include reading hostile letters from Islamist organizations and fielding questions from journalists demanding that they explain their “Islamophobia.” By now, Army officers and civilians understand that exposing Islamism in the Army is a career killer,⁵ but good men do it anyway because it is the honorable thing to do. And these are small risks compared with those US soldiers in uniform take every day.  Among Jim’s awards is the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and he could have served meritoriously in defense of his Army and country. He could have been one hell of a fighter against the Islamist enemy. He didn’t have to be a bureaucrat, which, let’s face it, is what he was.⁶

Mark Silinsky is a senior US Army counterintelligence analyst. His opinions are his own and do not represent those of the US Army. He would like to hear from anyone involved in the Fort Hood investigation and promises confidentiality. He can be reached at Silinsky@yahoo.com

[1] He sat alongside Paul Stockton, the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs and Lieutenant Colonel Reid Sawyer, director of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

[2] Brittany Snapp, “Former Durant resident testifies in front of Congress”, Durant Daily Democrat, January 2, 2011.

[3] I knew Jim briefly and superficially when we worked on an Army counterterrorism alert force at Fort Meade. Our relationship was friendly but not familiar.

[4] Terry Malloy was the fictional character portrayed by Marlon Brando in Bud Schulberg’s and Elia Kazan’s “On the Waterfront.”

[5] Trust me!

[6] “You don't understand. I coulda had class. I coulda been a contender. I coulda been somebody, instead of a bum, which is what I am, let's face it. It was you, Charley”

 

Paul Stockton Speaks before a Congressional Committee on Pearl Harbor Day

Paul Stockton Speaks before a Congressional Committee on Pearl Harbor Day

Mark Silinsky 
 

      Readers of Right Truth may have seen last month’s Congressional hearings involving terrorist attacks against US military personnel, particularly in the homeland. If not, it is on CSPAN. I felt compelled to write to several Congressmen because I was dissatisfied with the testimony. You may share my concerns about the inadequacy of the US military efforts to define the terrorist enemy. If so, you might like to write to you Congressman; they listen.  This was my message:  

Dear Congressman, 

      I am a senior counterintelligence analyst in the Department of the Army and share your concerns about the Islamist threat to the Department of Defense (DoD). I have argued for years about the inadequacy of US Army/DoD efforts to inform the Force about the Islamist, or political Islamist, threat. Secretary Paul Stockton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, testified before the Congressional Committee on the Homeland Security and the Senate’s Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on December 7, 2011.¹ Below are elements of his testimony in italics and my remarks, for your consideration: 

“The terrorist threat to our military communities is serious, and will remain so for years to come.” 

      Secretary Stockton mentioned al Qaeda but did not address the ideology and passions that drive it. Does Islamic doctrine espoused by firebrand clerics and inculcated through Saudi-funded madrassas come into play? It is also significant and disappointing that Secretary Stockton did not address issues of hostile ideological subversion or infiltration in the DoD.

“When it comes to defining the enemy, this Administration wishes to avoid imprecise terminology that may cause confusion and may unjustifiably give credence to the falsehood –despite our best intentions – that we are waging a war on Islam.” 

        But the Secretary did not define the enemy, other than the al Qaeda franchise. Assuming terrorists are motivated by an ideology, why did he not precisely define the enemy, its ideology, its domestic support base, and its political agenda. Certainly, the US is not waging on war on Islam, but many Americans are concerned that elements of Islamism are waging war on the US homeland.  

  “ Every day, patriotic Muslim-Americans serve in our military, often providing linguistic and cultural competencies essential to disrupting and defeating our actual enemy: al Qaeda and its adherents and affiliates worldwide.” 

      True but irrelevant. There are patriotic Muslim Americans, but there are also unpatriotic Muslim Americans. Counterintelligence and security is not concerned with praising patriotic Americans. Its mission is to unmask and neutralize spies, saboteurs, subversives, and terrorists.  He stated that the actual enemy was and is “al Qaeda and its adherents and affiliates worldwide.” But the Secretary did not identify its adherents’ and affiliates’ belief systems, mores, social norms, cultural characteristics, and world aspirations.  

“In the last decade, a plurality of these domestic violent extremists chose to target the Department of Defense (DoD), making military communities the target of choice for homegrown terrorists. Fourteen of seventeen Americans killed in the homeland by domestic violent extremists have been DoD personnel.”

      The 14 DoD personnel Secretary Stockton cited were killed by “domestic violent extremists.” True. But earlier in his testimony he called for “precision” in describing the enemy. Was the Secretary unaware of common ideological or common denominators among the killers? Why was he not more precise?

“After the tragic shooting at Fort Hood, then-Secretary Gates commissioned the DoD Independent Review related to Fort Hood to identify gaps and deficiencies in DoD's force protection programs, policies, and procedures.”

      Fort Hood was not a tragedy; it was an atrocity. Tragic deaths in Texas come from rattlesnake bites, truck crashes, rodeo and NASCAR accidents, and barn fires. In the Army, tragedies come from training accidents and helicopter crashes. The mass slaughter of Army men and women by an Islamist in a US Army uniform was an atrocity. As for the DoD’s Independent Review of the Fort Hood murders, how well did the study define the ideological and political motivators of the perpetrator. The absence of candor is the dominant, and yes tragic, flaw in the study.

      At no point in Secretary Stockton’s testimony did he mention a DoD- or service-wide, robust, Islamist-specific program of any consequence.  Such a program would explain the ideological and doctrinal underpinnings of Islamism, as well as its origins and organizations such as the Islamic Brotherhood and it US affiliates. That program would explain, if only briefly, the significance of Hasan al Banna, Sayid Qutb, and Sayid al-Maududi and their subversive implications for servicemen and women. Takiyyaa, or doctrinally mandated lying, would be discussed, particularly from a counterintelligence and security perspective. An Islamist-indicator checklist would be established as security tool.  But none of this exists because leaders in the US Army’s Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) have prevented their production. And the Director of the Army Counterintelligence Center Claude “Bud” Benner spiked counter-Islamist-specific briefings before and after the Fort Hood killings.

      December 7, 2011 is not a day that will live in infamy. There was nothing horrific or grandiose about Secretary Stockton’s bland testimony. But for those who had hoped for candid testimony about Islamism in the DoD, it was a day of disappointment and for Paul Stockton an hour of shame. And this moment points to a dangerous tomorrow. There will be more atrocities committed by Islamists and no meaningful DoD or Army program to stop them. And if analysts in the Department of Army try to warn the Force about Islamism, Army intelligence leaders will try to fire them. I should know. But, we can help prevent that. May I talk to you or your staffers about the inadequacies of the Army counter-Islamist programs and of high-level efforts in US Army intelligence to silence those who are trying to protect the Force? You may be interested in my blog on Islamism and the US Army at http://righttruth.typepad.com/right_truth/mark-silinsky.

Yours, Mark Silinsky

Mark Silinsky is a senior counterintelligence analyst in the US Army. His views do not represent those of the US Army or Department of Defense…obviously.

 

 1 http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/joint-hearing-homegrown-terrorism-threat-military-communities-inside-united-states

For US Army Counterintelligence: If Right-wing Extremism, Why not Islamism?

 by Mark Silinsky

    At a recent town hall meeting for US Army counterintelligence personnel, leaders opened the session with the promise of new vigor and a sharpened focus towards identifying, targeting and neutralizing “extremist” threats to the Army.  Initially, the audience responded with enthusiasm.  Many hoped that Army would finally get tough with political Islam, or Islamism, and shift direction from a passive, weak, and reactive approach to Islamist murder, infiltration, and subversion, and towards more dynamic and proactive counterintelligence operations and analysis. They would leave the meeting, once again, disappointed and fatalistic.

    US Army counterintelligence leaders delivered the well-worn patter song of apologetics and excuses for their refusal to deal honestly and openly with the Islamist threat to the Army.  There were slides explaining why Islamism could not be singled out among extremist ideologies, as well as nonsensical claims that “99.9% of American Muslims are against violence.”¹   Interestingly, Islamic extremism was paired with right-wing extremism on several slides.  Speakers assured the audience that Islamists are no more threatening than right wingers.

 
Figure 1 Skinheads- A Nasty Element of the 1990s Right-wing Extremist Mix

    OK.  But, if this is the case, why doesn’t the Army treat Islamists as it treated right wingers earlier?  In fact, Army counterintelligence has a strong record in identifying, analyzing, and targeting right-wing extremists and educating soldiers about them during the 1990s.  The US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC)²  produced many classified and unclassified articles on the skinhead violence, particularly in Europe.   In the early 1990s, the US Army had many troops stationed in Germany and some in Britain, and both these countries had loud, aggressive, and obnoxious populations of skinheads. There were also vicious racial bigots in the States, some of whom targeted homosexuals; ethnic minorities, particularly blacks; and Jews.  For this reason ITAC produced a briefing on right-wing extremism and distributed it to US Army forces around the world.³  

    The ITAC briefing detailed the political agenda, organizational structure, dress, subculture, and location of right-wingers who might target US soldiers, more than a few of whom were black. The briefing was candid, well received, and left the reader in no doubt as to where the US Army stood on the issue of right-wing extremist politics.

    So, why is there no similar effort directed against Islamists 20 years later, despite repeated pleas of US Army counterintelligence analysts to initiate them?⁴   The answer is simple;  it is politics. In the 1990s, there were no organizations that rallied behind right-wing advocates of violence.  No senator or congressman said that skinheads were misunderstood and well-meaning young men who had their belief system hijacked by a few extremists.  Right-wingers were not lavishly sponsored by Saudi Arabia, and there were no foreign-funded apologists for skinheads at US universities.  US Army leaders did not sweat about explaining “right-wing-o-phobia” before Congressional committees or having civil rights law suits filed against them.  And that allowed aggressive Army analysts to distribute briefings and awareness posters and engage with Congressional staff on the issue.

Figure 2 The New Threat to the US and to its Army

    Today, much of the skinhead threat belongs to history, but the US Army faces the very real threat of Islamism.  US Army counterintelligence analysts have no interest in the religious aspects of Islam. It is not an issue of theology.  Islam is a largely political and legal belief system, and, like right-wing extremism, Islamism conflicts with many US Army values.  While the US Army succeeded in fighting right-wing extremism in the 1990s, it has failed to muster the courage to fight Islamism today.  It is likely that Islamists will strike again, and, if they do, who will explain to the mothers of murdered soldiers the reasons for US Army passivity?  Who will explain to them that US Army leaders did not want to offend Muslims or civil libertarians?  And if such a murder occurs, how many US Army leaders will step forward and say, “It is my fault. I could have helped prevent it. I will take responsibility and resign my commission?” Probably not many. 

Mark Silinsky is a senior counterintelligence analyst for the US Army. His views do not represent those of the US Army or any agency of the US government. He may be contacted at Silinsky@yahoo.com.

Notes:

1   Predictably, the speaker did not cite a source for the 99.9% figure. Credible polling does not support any such claim.

2  ITAC was a subordinate command of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command. It was decommissioned in the mid-1990s, and its counterintelligence functions were place under the 902nd MI Group in the Army Counterintelligence Center.
3  ITAC also produced a poster that detailed the politics, subculture, dress, and behavior of skinheads and other vicious racial bigots. Like the briefing, this poster was distributed around the world.
4  Soon after the September 2001 Islamist attacks, a few analysts began concentrating of the Islamist threat to the US Army. A beta version of a briefing was distributed to intelligence elements around the world. Like the right-wing extremist briefing of the 1990s, this briefing was well received and highly sought. However, it was cancelled by senior US Army counterintelligence leaders, despite demand from intelligence and security officials and analysts.

 

(see all articles by Mark Silinsky at Right Truth here)

The US Army, Harassment, and Islamism

By Mark Silinsky

    The US Army takes sexual harassment seriously and has an annual two-hour workshop to prevent it. Once each year, soldiers and civilians are required to attend this workshop during which they listen to a facilitator, watch films of unwanted sexual advances, and respond to questions.  This is intended to foster awareness of harassing behavioral patterns and to instill a culture of awareness and prevention.  Though occasionally heavy on bathos, the skits help young soldiers understand what behavior is expected of them and activity they must avoid.

    Sexual harassment awareness is not the only class that soldiers must take annually. Computer security, drug avoidance, suicide prevention, and terrorism prevention are also topics that require annual certification. But there is nothing of substance involving the threat of political Islam, or Islamism. Despite the murders by Islamists in Army uniforms and the preaching of hate by those associated with the US Army, there is no Army-wide, substantive briefing to educate soldiers! Nor are there serious and coordinated efforts by veteran organizations to make soldiers aware of Islamist infiltration.  So, why are there such sincere and extensive efforts to combat sexual harassment and to boost computer security while there is stone silence on Islamism?

Islamist Behavioral Indicators- A Time for the US Army to Act

By Mark Silinsky

    As resources for the Department of Defense face sharp and sustained cuts, US Army counterintelligence will probably face lean times.¹  There is no easy answer for meeting burgeoning counterintelligence challenges with declining resources.²  But there is an aspect of counterintelligence that is less reliant on funding than it is on observation, persistence, honesty and risk taking. US Army counterintelligence and force protection personnel must be more active and competent at meeting the threat of Islamist subversion and murder in the US Army. 

    Islamism, or political Islam, is a danger in the US Army that has not been adequately addressed by Army leaders despite the multiple shootings, near misses, and arrests of Muslim subversives involved in the US military chaplaincy.³   At a minimum, US Army personnel could brief personnel on indicators of Islamist behavior and solicit reports from personnel who witness Islamist behavior inconsistent with Army security practices and with Army values.  US Army counterintelligence doctrine allows for, even requires, that this be done.

    US Army intelligence has a mission, both stated in doctrine and implicit in that doctrine ⁴, to brief Army personnel on terrorist and espionage threats.  Army regulations require that behavioral indicators of terrorism are to be identified and briefed to soldiers. In addition, a collection effort to identify and report on those whose behavior is threatening to US Army interests is required. Some of those behavioral indicators are as follows:

a. Suggesting allegiance to a state or to a nation, such as an Islamic nation, rather than to the United States.   There were many instances in which American Muslims declared that they would not or should not be deployed to fight against Muslims. Had American Christians declared they would not fight German or Italian Christians in 1942, GEN Marshall could not have fielded an Army.

b. Promoting an Islamist cultural or political agenda that clashes with the values or regulations of the US Army.  There were many instances when Muslims made comments that the American values were base and its culture hateful. They claimed that US policies in the Middle East were unjust US Army soldiers engaged in those wars were legitimate targets for attack.

 Figure 1 MAJ Hasan’s Presentation to Fellow Army Doctors Caused Confusion

 

c. Belonging to or being regularly affiliated with organizations with ties to Islamist organizations.  These organizations include affiliates or outgrowths of the Islamic Brotherhood, such as the Council on American Islamic Relations and the Islamic Society of North America, both of which are unindicted co-conspirators in a federal terrorism case. Works by Anwar al-Awlaki, a contemporary Islamist, and Said Qutb, the leading theoretician of the early Islamic Brotherhood, are also seditious. 

d. Advocating literature that promotes the hatred of the West, democracy, Christianity, Judaism, and the United States.  Several of the US Army Islamists, such as SGT Ali Mohammad, MAJ Hassan, and PFC Abdo were very vocal with their anger at the United States and active on Islamist websites.

e. Sharp outbursts of anger at victories of US Army troops against enemy forces who are Muslims, as in Iraq or Afghanistan. Expressing sympathy with the enemy who are Muslim. Wouldn’t loyal soldiers celebrate US military victories and mourn the loss of fellow American soldiers?

     
 
Figure 2 PFC Nasser Abdo Gave Many Clues

    These are just several of the behavioral indicators that should have alerted US Army security and counterintelligence personnel to the dangers of Islamism within the ranks in the past and could do so in the future. It is and has been within the mission of the US Army to protect and inform soldiers about threats to their safety. And there is no reason apparent to this author why US Army troops have not been briefed on these indicators.⁵  In a time of declining resources for US Army counterintelligence personnel and a simultaneous increase in the threat of Islamism, a robust briefing on the Islamist threat to the ranks is as necessary as it is cost free.  By being more honest about the threat and becoming more aggressive at identifying and challenging the Islamist enemy, US Army counterintelligence can and must do more with less.  America’s soldiers and Army civilians deserve it.

 

    Mark Silinsky is a senior counterintelligence analyst for the US Army. His views do not represent those of the US Army.  He is very interested in hearing from service members or national security personnel who share his concerns of Islamism in the military or US government.  He can be reached at Silinsky@yahoo.com. 

NOTES:

1  Counterintelligence (CI). Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. Source:   Executive Order 12333, as amended 30 July 2008 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 11 Mar 2011
2  This is because the intelligence collection threat from high-technology hungry growing powers, such as China and India, is not likely to wane. As these and other countries step-up their collection efforts and begin to mine new sources of technology, more demands will be placed on US Army project managers, facility security personnel, and counterintelligence analysts.
3  The US Army Regulation 301.12 “Army Threat Awareness and Reporting” has given the commander of the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) the mandate to protect US Army personnel through a number of programs and platforms. 
4  The DA personnel should report, in accordance with the instructions in chapter 4, information regarding DA personnel who exhibit any of the behaviors that may be associated with a potential espionage or international terrorist threat and those associated with extremist activity that may pose a threat to the Army, or DOD, or disrupt U.S. military operations as described in the tables 3–1, 3–2, and 3–3, below.

5    There have been briefings that included one or two slides on the Hasan or Akbar killings. But these treatments only superficially address the Islamist threat. Had troops at Fort Hood been given adequate briefings on Islamism – and this author made briefings available to senior leaders in US Army intelligence years before the murders – would MAJ Hasan have been cashiered before he killed?

 

Islamism, Terrorism and US Army Doctrine

By Mark Silinsky

    In order to understand fully the US Army’s responsibility to protect its soldiers against terrorism, it is important to understand doctrine, which is the official way of doing things. Usually, doctrine is a broad and recommended, as opposed to narrow and required, approach to a task. Sometimes doctrinal documents are helpful and clearly written guides.¹   But many other US Army doctrinal documents are turgid and, for many readers, arcane. For this reason, they are not often read outside of military and academic circles. But those who care about the Islamist threat to the US Army are well advised to understand the doctrinal elements of the US Army’s mission to combat terrorism.²

    There is counterterrorism (CT) doctrine and anti-terrorism (AT) in the Army.   CT activities are offensive and often dynamic, while AT measures are more defensive and do not involve the application of violence.³  For example, CT operations include the spectacular commando operation against bin Laden in Pakistan. AT efforts might include the drafting, vetting, and distribution of an Army-wide briefing on the Islamist threat to the US Army. AT activity also includes mundane measures involving securing gates, checking locks, positioning guards, etc. If these AT measures are less cinematic than CT measures, they are often equal in force protection importance.

    The US Army and Three Sources of Terrorism 

    According to United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), terrorism comes from at least three different sources.⁴    They are domestic terrorism, international terrorism, and extremist groups and organizations.

    a. Domestic terrorism is action “involving groups or individuals whose activities are directed at elements of our government or population without foreign direction.”⁵ 

    b. International terrorism is action “involving groups or individuals whose activities are foreign-based, and/or directed by countries or groups outside the U.S., or whose activities transcend national boundaries.”

    c. Extremist groups are organizations “that espouse supremacist causes, foster discrimination based on race, creed, color, gender, religion, or national origin, and advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights.”⁶ 

    TRADOC 525.13 and the Islamist Challenge

    How do the US Army doctrine 525.13 and AT measures relate to Islamism?  If domestic or international actors involve themselves in the “unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to coerce or intimidate a government or a society” they are, according to definition, terrorists.  According to Army doctrine, MAJ Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood killer, or SGT Hasan Akbar, the soldier who killed in Kuwait, were terrorists. They may have been insane, but they are nevertheless terrorists. They may have been economically deprived and socially alienated, but they were economically deprived and socially alienated terrorists. The point is, if Muslims use violence or threaten to use violence against the US Army they are terrorists. If they do on the basis of Islamic mandates, it is accurate, in the view of this author, to refer to them as Islamist terrorists.

    But another category under 525.13 is often overlooked, and it is the category of extremist groups.  This category is important because there are several Islamist groups that keep themselves “once-removed” from terrorists to give themselves the patina of legitimacy. These organizations do not openly advocate violence against the US Army or US Army personnel, and it is unlikely that they would be brazenly contemptuous of American liberalism.  Rather, front organizations of the Islamic Brotherhood offer a mask of moderation to avoid the impression of extremism, a stigma that would impede their high-level access to military and government leaders and might hinder their privilege seeking. Some, such as the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), have succeeded and today enjoy credibility among intellectual elites, law enforcement personnel, and, in some cases, the military.

   

 Figure 1 A CAIR Notice to Muslims

 

     These groups have relevance to AT. Notorious gunmen such as Hasan and Akbar command the headlines, but extremist groups deserve equal scrutiny. Has the US Army been sufficiently aggressive in warning the troops of Islamist extremist groups, such as CAIR?   US Army counterintelligence, by virtue of its mission, is always at war. But how effectively has it engaged the Janus-faced Islamist enemy that waves American flags while simultaneously promoting vicious, violent Koranic verses in mosques, schools, and on US Army posts?

 

Mark Silinsky is a senior counterintelligence analyst for the US Army. His views do not represent those of the US Army.  He is very interested in hearing from service members or national security personnel with similar concerns of Islamism in the military or US government.  He can be reached at Silinsky@yahoo.com. 

NOTES:

1  A fine example of this is the counterinsurgency doctrine, which was promulgated to wide acclaim several years ago. It was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize
 2  In the Army, “terrorism is characterized as the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to coerce or intimidate a government or a society.”
3  According to TRADOC Reg 525-13 the anti-terrorism and counterterrorism are determined by TRADOC. “This regulation prescribes responsibilities, policies, procedures, and minimum standards for developing, implementing, and managing a Force Protection Program (FPP). It is written with HQ TRADOC staff and installations in mind. Force Protection (FP) is the security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, within the TRADOC area of responsibility; at home station, during mobilization, during deployment, and in conjunction with overseas temporary duty or permanent change of station.”  Source:  Department of the Army, Headquarters, United States Army, Training and Doctrine Command, 12 December 1997.
4   Military Operations United States Army Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Force Protection Program (FPP)  Http://Www.Tradoc.Army.Mil/Tpubs/Regs/R525-13.htm
5  Military Operations United States Army Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Force Protection Program (FPP)  Http://Www.Tradoc.Army.Mil/Tpubs/Regs/R525-13.htm
6  Military Operations United States Army Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Force Protection Program (FPP)  Http://Www.Tradoc.Army.Mil/Tpubs/Regs/R525-13.htm
 

“Why Can’t these Muslims Just be Crazy Too?”

 By Mark Silinsky
   
    Soon after the Fort Hood shooting, Ibrahim Hooper of the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) asked, “Why can’t Muslims just be crazy, too?” By this, he meant that Muslims, like adherents of other religions, sometimes become deranged and commit, in his words, crazy acts of violence.  It is helpful to define craziness because the word is used differently and often without precision. For example, it is frequent in song. Paul Simon reminisces warmly about an old friend who is still “crazy after all these years.”  Patsy Klein sang Willie Nelson’s lyrics about a crazy, uncontrollable love, and the 1980s band Heart song about a young woman’s passionate, crazy love. But physicians and lawyers have more precise, clinical definitions.  Next year, military judges will need to determine whether MAJ Hasan was legally insane, and his life will lie in consequence.
 
    How does the law view insanity?  The law has evolved. The British have taken a person’s mental state into consideration when administering justice for several centuries. In fact, in the late 13th Century, the concept of “complete madness” was introduced into common law courts.  Along Britain’s legal path, a belief that witches and demons took possession of peoples’ minds and souls left temporary imprints on the law. In what became known as the “wild beast” standard, a person’s legal liability of his actions was reduced if he were, as implied by the name of the standard, frothing-at-the-mouth, howling mad.¹ 

This changed in the mid-19th Century when a Mr. M’Naughten tried to kill Prime Minister Robert Peel, but instead killed his secretary.  Medical experts testified that he was floridly insane and could not distinguish between right and wrong. When he pulled the trigger, he was under the delusion that the prime minister owed him money but refused to pay his debt, thus he felt he was fully entitled to kill him as a consequence.   At its core, the M’Naughten defense was a test of ethics as much as sanity because it required a determination that killing a man for a non-existent or existent debt was not wrong.

The M’Naughten Standard was adopted, with modifications, in the United States. Major revisions came in the 1980s, when there was a popular view that too many defendants who seemed sane were being acquitted on the insanity defense. Many states and the federal government required that a person had to be compelled by an irresistible impulse to be declared insane. The mere failure to distinguish between right and wrong was necessary but not sufficient for acquittal on the basis of insanity. A person must not be able to control himself.²  It is sometimes called the “policeman-at-the-elbow defense.” Would somebody have behaved a certain way if a policeman was standing at his elbow?  And this is about where the law stands today.

Hasan: An Officer and a Jihadist
   
MAJ Nidal Hasan’s lawyer said that his client was not sane when he murdered 13 people at Fort Hood, TX.  It is not likely that council will revise the strategy of his defense given the pre-meditation, calculation, and apparent enthusiasm with which his client slaughtered 13 Army and Army-affiliated people.
   
Was he insane when he killed, or was he a determined Islamist following his understanding of his religion’s demands? Much has been learned about Hasan since his shooting spree. Anwar Al Awlaki, who now lives in Yemen, was his spiritual leader at the local Dar al-Hijra mosque and, significantly, several of the 9/11 conspirators were congregants there.  Today, in his Yemen home, Al Awalki calls Hasan a hero and a role model for other American Muslims.

 Figure 1 A Seated Hasan in Court

Hasan’s loyalty to the US had been dubious for years, despite the oath he took as a commissioned officer to support the US and its Constitution. On forms requesting his nationality, he began listing himself as a Palestinian, rather than American. More than a few times, he penned vitriolic comments against the US on Internet fora, and he was flamboyant about his contempt for American foreign policy and world Jewry.  Further, he injected politics into issues, social gatherings, and professional meetings where such topics would not be naturally found.

 
Figure 2 Nidal Hasan Soldier of Allah

    His behavior did not go unnoticed by his co-workers, some of whom became suspicious and nervous. His fellow soldiers and physicians did not know what to make of his behavior or how to deal with it. The Army has stressed religious inclusion and tolerance, and officers accused of insensitivity could be penalized on their annual evaluations. On Hasan’s business card he had “SoA” printed on it, as shown above, which meant, by his own admission, “soldier of Allah.”  But in Islamic culture, did this indicate disloyalty or something else?   If deployed to a theater of war in which Americans were ordered to kill Muslims, how would he behave?  He answered these questions at Fort Hood. There is no available information that he was insane by current civilian standards when he killed his fellow soldiers.  If there is evidence that he had visual or auditory hallucinations, none has been recorded. 

And What of Military Justice?

    What is the threshold of insanity under the Uniformed Code of Military Justice?  According to a 2006 article in a leading journal on law and psychiatry, the threshold is quite high.³  SGT Hassan Akbar was sentenced to death for killing his fellow soldiers in Kuwait during the Gulf War. That Akbar was odd, reclusive, and often obnoxious was never in in dispute. But according to the judges who decided his fate, he was not insane. As a consequence, they sentenced him to die.

    And what of MAJ Hasan? Will his fate be that of his co-religionist SGT Akbar? Judges will decide next year when they try him on 13 counts of murder and other related crimes. Are there other MAJ Hasans lurking in today’s Army? That is an issue for US Army security and counterintelligence professionals. And regardless of Hasan’s fate, this issue will not go away.

Mark Silinsky is a senior counterintelligence analyst for the US Army. His views do not represent those of the US Army.  He is very interested in hearing from service members or national security personnel with similar concerns of Islamism in the military or US government.  He can be reached at Silinsky@yahoo.com. 

Notes:

1  A person behaved as though he were "totally deprived of his understanding and memory so as not to know what he [was] doing, no more than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast."

2  The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (U.S.)

3   Meredith L. Mona, MD, Carroll J. Diebold, MD and Ava B. Walton, MD, “Update on the Disposition of Military Insanity Acquittees,” Journal of  the Academy of Psychiatry and the Law,  August 2006 , http://www.jaapl.org/cgi/content/full/34/4/538,  

 

Tomorrow’s Killing Fields: MAJ Hasan, Soft Targets, and Wolf Packs

By Mark Silinsky

    In 2012, MAJ Nidal Hasan will stand trial for his Fort Hood killing spree. His trial date was set within a week of the arrest of a would-be protégé’ Nasser Jason Abdo who was apprehended for planning a repeat performance of Hasan’s blood bath. Both men are US soldiers; both men are Muslims.

    In an Article 32 hearing, Hasan was charged with 13 counts of premeditated murder and other counts of attempted premeditated murder. He could be sentenced to die, though execution is very rare in the US military. In fact, the last execution of a serviceman took place in 1961.¹  If he receives the death sentence and if there is a death row at Fort Leavenworth, he could find himself bunking with SGT Hassan Akbar. SGT Akbar, born Mark Fidel Kools, is an equally angry American Muslim who rolled a grenade into the tent of fellow American soldiers in Kuwait and then shot dying survivors as they struggled from their tent.²  He killed two soldiers, wounded others, and for his crimes Akbar is scheduled to die.

     Why did these American soldiers kill fellow soldiers whom they never met or knew only superficially? Was there a collective psychosis? Trying to make sense of these atrocities, commentators and analysts navigate through a fog of imprecise rhetoric. Often, Hasan’s Islamic faith is downplayed or trivialized. This was certainly the case with the Department of Defense’s Fort Hood investigation headed by the former Secretary of the Army and the Navy’s top admiral.³   US government and military officials take refuge in a lexicon of well-worn, politically acceptable terminology.  And this vagueness and misapplication of this terminology clouds the larger debate on Muslim killers in the US Army. For example, the term “lone wolf” is much in use, but what does it mean?  Hasan may have been a lone wolf in planning and executing his crime, but he is hardly spiritually alone.  Anwar Awlaki, his Yemen-based mentor who is an acknowledged and respected Islamic cleric, praised him as a hero. Were MAJ Hasan, SGT Akbar and PFC Abdo lone wolves with diseased minds? Perhaps, but at what number do these lone wolves become a wolf pack, and when does a wolf pack become a national threat?

   
 
Figure 1 MAJ Nidal Malik Hasan- A Lone Wolf or an Islamist Hero?

    Another troubling term is “soft target,” which is a value-neutral term that generally refers to targets to which/whom access is easy. Heavily protected Fort Knox, as Goldfinger understood, is a very hard target, while the soldiers at Fort Hood were soft targets on the day of their death.  But they were soft targets for MAJ Hasan because he was an American soldier with access to the US Army facilities. The slaughtered soldiers were probably far less accessible, that is “harder targets”, to local pizza delivery boys, off-post construction workers, and Camp Fire Girls than to a soldier who had an extensive record of anti-American hatred.

    This is important because US Army security and counterintelligence personnel allowed MAJ Hasan access to his 13 “soft targets” despite massive evidence that he was, in Senators Lieberman’s and Collins’ words, “a ticking time bomb.”⁴      For example, Hasan lectured his fellow soldiers on the incompatibility of Islamic principles with the US Army’s mission.  He literally lectured them!  At a June 2007 slide presentation at Walter Reed Hospital he delivered a farrago of Islamic-related ideas, injunctions, admonitions, and twisted explanations of all things Islamic  to a surprised audience of senior Army doctors who came to hear a lecture on psychiatry.  In his lecture “The Koranic World View as it Relates to Muslims in the U.S. Military,” which is shown in figure 1, a leitmotif of Islamist supremacy clearly resonated to all who were listening.  His words became action as he gunned-down US soldiers in the name of Allah on Fort Hood’s killing field.

 Figure 2 Hasan’s Hostility of American Military Shone Clearly 

    An entire religion cannot and should not be put on trial for the mass murder of one or two or three of its adherents. But, the high publicity of Hasan’s trial raises uncomfortable questions for US Army security and counterintelligence leaders.  In early 2010, The Associated Press speculated that as many as eight officers could be disciplined for failing to report Hasan.⁵  Perhaps, if this happened, they deserved to be disciplined. But how strong were the US Army efforts to warn the ranks of Islamism, or political Islam, and the threat it poses to soldiers’ safety? Did US Army security and counterintelligence personnel render the Fort Hood victims “soft targets” by failing to act on repeated warnings that Hasan was a clear and present danger?   

    Crassly put, do US Army security and counterintelligence personnel have the blood of Fort Hood’s “soft targets” on their hands? If they do, what will be done about it?  This author hopes much will be done, but fears very little or nothing at all. And for this reason, there will be more Muslim wolves and wolf packs preying in the US Army who will turn today’s US Army posts into tomorrow’s killing fields.

Mark Silinsky is a senior counterintelligence analyst for the US Army. His views do not represent those of the US Army.  He is very interested in hearing from service members or national security personnel who share his concerns of Islamism in the military or US government.  He can be reached at Silinsky@yahoo.com. 

NOTES

1  Brad Knickerbocker, “Alleged Fort Hood shooter Maj. Nidal Hasan Faces March 2012 Trial,” Christian Science Monitor, July 20, 2011.

2  Akbar Sentenced to Death for Grenade Attack, April 29, 2005. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,154969,00.html

3  “The U.S. military's just-released report into the Fort Hood shootings spends 86 pages detailing various slipups by Army officers but not once mentions Major Nidal Hasan by name or even discusses whether the killings may have had anything to do with the suspect's view of his Muslim faith.”   Source:  Time Magazine http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1954960,00.html#ixzz1UKkwozK3

4  “US Senators Joe Lieberman (I) of Connecticut, chairman of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, and Susan Collins of Maine, the committee’s top Republican, said the Defense Department and the FBI should have recognized that Hasan had become an adherent of “violent Islamist extremism” before he went on a shooting rampage at Fort Hood .” Source:  Brad Knickerbocker, “Alleged Fort Hood shooter Maj. Nidal Hasan Faces March 2012 trial”, Christian Science Monitor, July 20, 2011.

5  Gary Martin; Guillermo Contreras. "Ft. Hood inquiry warns of wider security issues; Pentagon finds oversight flaws Officers may face discipline." The Boston Globe (Boston, MA). International Herald Tribune. 2010. HighBeam Research. 7 Aug. 2011 http://www.highbeam.com.

 

Put The Pentagon’s Right-Wing Ideologues in the Unicorn Department

By Mark Silinsky

    Stop the presses! Nihad Awad, head of the unindicted co-conspiratorial, Muslim Brotherhood-front organization the Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR), is inveighing against “Islamophobia” in the US government and the military. Hardly new. But this time Awad offered his standard hallucinogenic twaddle on a Hamas-run television station.¹  His CAIR doppelganger, Ibrahim Hooper, gave a similar pitch on Iran’s Press TV, covering both Sunni and Shia Islamo-fascist bases. And these are the same men who daily trumpet CAIR’s American patriotism.

    The ever-imaginative Awad suggested the onus of Norwegian nut case’s shooting spree could be placed on – you guessed it – anti-Muslim Western conservatives. But brace yourself for what comes next. “As a consequence, Awad asked President Obama to stop U.S. intelligence agencies from allowing right-wing ideologues to "train" political and military leaders about Islam.”²  You read it right.

    Earth to Awad, “right-wing ideologues,” read men and women with the chutzpah to tell the truth about Islamism, are as common as unicorns grazing in the Pentagon’s E Ring.  Mr. Awad, what “right-wing training” are you talking about?   Let me make this offer to you in writing. Show me any unclassified, unapologetic, comprehensive training program produced by the Department of Defense or any intelligence agency³  that brings to light Takiyaa, or Islamic lying; the vast extent of the Islamic Brotherhood infiltration in the US, which includes your organization; a dozen or so of the Koran’s juicier “off with their heads” verses and assorted blood-lusting hadiths; or the pedophiliac inclinations of your prophet and I will send CAIR a check for $1,000.  Show me any such program in the US Army and I’ll double my offer. You have until the end of Ramadan to make your case.⁴ 

 Figure 1 Nihad Awad

    But like unicorns and Himalayan Bigfeet, such programs exist only in myths. They are the stuff of dreams. You have nothing to fear these days, Mr. Awad, of any comprehensive anti-Islamist security measures anywhere in the government that CAIR might find objectionable. You’ve certainly nothing to worry from the Pentagon’s four-star castrati who trip over themselves to ensure that the military’s chaplaincy is a comfort zone for Islamists such as Abdurman Alamoudi .  This is because they fear CAIR and other Islamist front organizations and will not fight you.  And I have no fears of sending your organization one dollar because there are no substantive, broadbase training programs that you can cite to refute my claim. But I wish you could prove me wrong. And, while we’re at it, I can dream that one day the US military will begin to take seriously the threat of Islamism in the ranks and expose the likes of you. And dream I do, sir. Dream I do.
   
    Mark Silinsky is a senior counterintelligence analyst for the US Army. His views do not represent those of the US Army.  He is very interested in hearing from service members or national security personnel who share his concerns of Islamism in the military or US government.  He can be reached at Silinsky@yahoo.com.

NOTES:

1  "CAIR Rep Speaks on Hamas TV, from the Investigative Project on Terrorism, August 5, 2011.
 2 “Executive director of Hamas-linked CAIR speaks on Hamas TV,” Jihad Watch, August 6, 2011. http://us.mg6.mail.yahoo.com/dc/launch
 3 This does not include the FBI, which has a first-rate analyst on the subject of Islamism and whose superiors in the Bureau have given his some latitude in presenting his message.
 4 Robert Spencer occasionally speaks to military audiences and bravo for that. My offer refers to a US government produced, delivered, and updated briefing that identifies the Islamist enemy and proposes countermeasures. There are annual, testable briefings on white slavery that Department of the Army personnel are required to pass. While not trivializing white slavery, it occurs to this Department of the Army employee that Islamism is a far greater threat to the force.
   Al-Amoundi is considered to be founder of the Muslim Chaplin program in the US Military and Prisons.  He is serving in US prison for several crimes relating to terrorism and conspiracy to commit murder.

A US Army Jihadi is Captured before He Kills—This Time

By Mark Silinsky
     
    Recently, Nasser Jason Abdo, US Muslim soldier intending to slaughter US Army personnel at Fort Hood, Texas, was nabbed before he could spray fire on anything that moved at Fort Hood. This is an improvement in US Army security.  In 2009, MAJ Nidal Hasan was arrested after he enthusiastically murdered his fellow US soldiers at Fort Hood.  For these reasons, both MAJ Hasan and PFC Abdo have been much in the news lately. The common threads connecting the officer and the enlisted man are Islamic alienation, anger, intended murder, and hatred of America.  Both are US soldiers who, as Muslims, felt doctrinally compelled to kill the main enemies of Islam- US Army soldiers.¹   One of them succeeded and one failed.

    Does Abdo’s early capture indicate an improvement in US Army force protection procedures, policies, or plans?  Currently, there is scant evidence to support this.   It appears that the credit for his capture should go to a small-town gun salesman named Greg Ebert, who was working at Guns Galore in Killeen, Texas. He operated on common sense and intuition to alert security officials.   According to the press, it happened something like this:

    Pfc Abdo had become a minor celebrity in the US Muslim community. Featured on al Jazeera, Pfc  Abdo had twice petitioned for conscientious objector status, the second time with success.²  Then came charges of illegal pornography, which clouded his easy exit from the US Army.

 
Nasser Jason Abdo After Being Arrested

    Abdo entered Guns Galore, the store with the dubious distinction of selling MAJ Hasan some of the ammunition he used in his Fort Hood shooting spree, and asked to buy ammunition and smokeless powder. Abdo asked Ebert what smokeless powder was and stated he wanted to buy many cans. But Ebert had suspicions and asked himself why Nasser Abdo wanted buy smokeless powder if he didn’t know its purpose. Ebert then called authorities.

    But what if Ebert, a retired policeman, didn’t act on his instinct and common sense? Rather, what if he observed Nasser Abdo’s weapons’ purchases through a multicultural prism? This would not be new. When asked about the odd, angry behavior of MAJ Hasan years before his carnage, several people who knew Hasan confided that they had strong suspicions but kept quiet because they did not want to be labeled as an “Islamophobe.”  They didn’t want to make waves in the Army.

    But Ebert wasn’t concerned about making waves last month.  By acting on experience and education he probably saved the lives of many soldiers. US Army security and counterintelligence officials can learn much from this. In addition, larger issues regarding Islam and the US Army emerge for debate. These ideas include:

     Different religions present different challenges to US Army security and counterintelligence personnel.  While many Muslims in the US Army are patriotic, others see their primary identity as being Muslim, not American. Hasan and Abdo are just two of several cases of Army-affiliated persons who asserted that a Muslim cannot fight other Muslims.  Christianity and Judaism do not require analogous prohibitions. In World War II, US Christian soldiers battled German Lutherans and Italian Catholics. Some men became conscientious objectors because of their ethical opposition to killing anyone. Abdo was granted conscientious objector status, and he didn’t have to kill anyone. But he, like Hasan, felt morally and religiously compelled to kill US soldiers as an Islamic mandate.

    A Muslim filling out forms to purchase weapons at Guns Galore or anywhere else may not feel obligated to reveal his true intentions .  Under the Islamic doctrine of deception, or takiyaa, a Muslim may disguise his true intentions if it furthers the cause of Islam. This is well established in Islamic doctrine and has not been sincerely renounced by any credible leading Islamic theologian. 

    The US Army does not address takiyya in its force protection doctrine, and this author is at loss to identify any official US Army counterintelligence or security document that warns against takiyaa in sufficient detail. To do so would contradict the loadstone of contemporary Army culture that teaches that all religions are ethically similar.

    Islam is a religion of peace...on its terms.  Hasan and Abdo brought their political grievances to light initially peacefully, if sometimes ostentatiously and bizarrely. Hasan gave a lecture on Islam to an auditorium of physicians expecting a lecture on psychiatry. Abdo prattled on about his Muslim allegiance and world peace to viewers on al Jazeera. Both men demanded a peace based on Islamic values and then turned to violence only after their demands as Muslims were not met. These were not two lone cases. Theirs is the rhetoric of millions of Muslims around the world.³ 

    Soldiers must be given accurate sources of information to understand Islam If there are two schools of popular thought surrounding Islam and the West, they could be called the Karen Armstrong and Daniel Pipes schools.⁴  Both Armstrong and Pipes are widely read and respected by their audiences. But their audiences are very different, as are the tone and focus of the authors’ texts.  Armstrong markets a feel-good approach to Islam and to its purported messenger of   God, Mohammad. Celebrating the perceived beauties of Islam, Armstrong underlines warmth, inclusion, and respect for women and girls in the Islamic faith. Pipes does no such thing. He warns against Islam law, Sharia, and how it is being insinuated into the fabric of American life. Those in the Army today who propound the Pipes line are often seen as troublemakers and are dissuaded from becoming public in their views. Some leaders in the Army today do not want the negative attention that might come from the very active Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR). Some Army leaders have actively tried to silence analysts and activists in the ranks who have tried to raise the awareness of political Islam.

    Soon, more facts will emerge from the Abdo case. But there is much we already know. Abdo, like his self-stated hero MAJ Hasan, wanted to leave the US Army because he could not kill fellow Muslims. He voiced no similar objections to killing Jews, Christians, Hindus, Voodoo cult adherents or any religion other than Islam. Hasan’s and Abdo rhetoric is similar, often identical, to that of millions of Muslims around the world who quote the Koran as justification for killing American servicemen. 

     But this sordid story, so far as it goes, does have a hero. It is not a US Army security or counterintelligence operator or analyst, though one may emerge.  Rather, it is a salt-of-the-earth salesman who operated on common sense.  As a retired policeman, he understood suspicious behavior. His knowledge was based on experience and education.

    And what if Mr. Ebert did not call the police? Would Army security or counterintelligence personnel have alerted the police or provost martial out concern for Abdo’s hostile intent?  There is no way to know. Because Abdo was AWOL, Army personnel would have tried to catch him, though maybe too late. We do know that there is no comprehensive educational program to warn against political Islam in the ranks. What will US Army counterintelligence and security personnel learn from Abdo’s would-be carnage?  This author hopes that it will learn much, but fears that it will learn little, and suspects that what will be learned will probably be ignored. Too many leaders in US Army intelligence do not want to make waves.

Mark Silinsky is a senior counterintelligence analyst for the US Army. His views do not represent those of the US Army.  He is very interested in hearing from service members or national security personnel with similar concerns of Islamism in the military or US government.  He can be reached at Silinsky@yahoo.com. 

NOTES:

1.  Koran 5:51 literally warns Muslims against "taking the Jews and Christians as friends and allies ... whoever among you takes them for friends and allies, he is surely one of them," i.e., he becomes an infidel; 58:22 states that true Muslims do not befriend non-Muslims -- "even if they be their fathers, sons, brothers, or kin."

2.  He said early in his fight to be released from the Army, “I don't believe I can involve myself in an army that wages war against Muslims. I don't believe I could sleep at night if I take part, in any way, in the killing of a Muslim. ... I can't deploy with my unit to Afghanistan and participate in the war -- I can't both deploy and be a Muslim.”

3.  While fighting for his "conscientious objector" status, he pointed to "the peace that Islam preaches [10] 221;; he claimed [11] that he wanted to fight "Islamophobia" and "put a good positive spin out there that Islam is a good, peaceful religion."

4.  When this author delivered a beta version of a counter-Jihadist security briefing to a leader in the Army counterintelligence community in 2003, he was ordered not to deliver it but to read Karen Armstrong to understand Islam.