President’s Afghanistan Strategy: Repudiating GEN Petraeus
Sheik Ali al-Muthaba1 comments on “Differing views of new Afghan strategy,” article by Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, 26 December 2009RIGHT TRUTH EXCLUSIVE. 27 December 2009.
I am saddened to note that the article illustrates a widening rift between the National Command Authority and the White House on the war‘s objectives, goals, and strategy. Understandably so, as, eventually, someone will have to be blamed for having lost in Afghanistan. The year has been good for Taliban, who are on the verge of achieving their objectives, as stated by ADM Mike Mullen, a trend not readily reversed by the President taking his time to agree upon a new strategy and now taking his time implementing it, while overall retaining a constructive ambiguity on the strategy’s objectives. Lacking clarity of purpose, in times of war, a sure recipe for defeat.
To make the point on how strong the contrasts are between the civilian and military leadership, do let us compare some of Mr. Chandrasekaran’s quotations:Mr. Chandrasekaran reminds us that Vice President Biden told MSNBC last week: "The strategy has fundamentally changed. This is not a COIN strategy," using the military's shorthand for counterinsurgency. "This is not 'go out and occupy the whole country." He goes on to write: “Although senior-level civilians in the administration emerged from the review process thinking the mission had been circumscribed, senior military officials continue to have a different view. The result, as they see it, is that the White House has embraced McChrystal's original plan. … (In contrast) White House advisers maintain that the review process did refine the mission beyond what McChrystal had proposed over the summer. "There was a real narrowing here," the senior administration official said. "Stan has a big leadership task to adapt his original concept to the new strategic guidance."
Mr. Chandrasekaran writes: “The NSC's strategic guidance, a classified document that outlines the president's new approach, was described by the senior administration official as limiting military operations "in scale and scope to the minimum required to achieve two goals -- to prevent al-Qaeda safe havens and to prevent the Taliban from toppling the government." The use of resource-intensive counterinsurgency tactics -- employing U.S. forces to protect Afghan civilians from the Taliban -- is supposed to be restricted to key cities and towns in southern and eastern parts of the country, the official said."
Furthermore, “White House officials said the president opposes using the forces he has authorized to duplicate an expansive, Iraq-style counterinsurgency operation -- in part because he questions whether it will be possible to achieve a similar outcome in Afghanistan, which is less developed, and because he wants to start reducing troops in 18 months. The White House's desired end state in Afghanistan, officials said, envisions more informal local security arrangements than in Iraq, a less-capable national government and a greater tolerance of insurgent violence. "
In that, the President is repudiating GEN Petraeus’ approach in Iraq, realizing that, a momentary reduction in violence notwithstanding, President Bush’s surge in 2007 failed to achieve any of its stated political objectives. The President further realizing that he is confronting a similar outcome in Afghanistan. Therefore, the President is justified in narrowing the scope of U.S. political objectives in Afghanistan. The narrowing of the U.S. military mission must be seen integral to the narrowing of the political scope. And yet, as Mr. Chandrasekaran writes: “Senior military officials still think they can achieve a better outcome than envisaged by civilian skeptics in the administration by using the new forces to mount more comprehensive counterinsurgency operations. Although Pentagon strategists and McChrystal's advisers in Kabul are looking at how they can fulfill the White House desire for a less extensive mission, military officials said they are reluctant to strip too much away and weaken an approach that has come to be revered within the ranks as the only way to suppress guerrilla movements. … McChrystal's plan, the senior Pentagon official said, "is still counterinsurgency, regardless of the various agendas people are trying to spin."
President Obama’s surge in Afghanistan is President Bush’s surge in Iraq revisited. Except, President surged to buy time, while digging in deeper, whereas President Obama, having shorn up his right flank, is setting forth an exit strategy on acceptable terms to both, the United States and the insurgency. Only to find himself undercut by the military brass.
Mr. Chandrasekaran writes: “Two days before announcing the deployment of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan, President Obama informed Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal that he was not granting McChrystal's request to double the size of the Afghan army and police. …The president told McChrystal, the top commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, to focus for now on fielding a little more than half that number by next October.” A further clear indication that the President did not approve the General’s war plan. As yet, still not officially in the public domain, as to how many additional U.S. troops the General really requested, all the while having convinced the American public that the 30k figure, the General’s low-end, was what he really was asking for at the high end.
As a result, while the President directs one thing, the military continues to plan for something else. As Mr. Chandrasekaran writes: “Ten days after Obama's speech, the U.S. command responsible for training the Afghans circulated a chart detailing the combined personnel targets for the army and police. McChrystal's goal of 400,000 remained unchanged. "It's an open issue," a senior Pentagon official said last week.” And I would have thought, the President has spoken.
At the same time, states Mr. Chandrasekaran, “Members of Obama's war cabinet disagree over the meaning of his pledge to begin drawing down forces in July 2011 and whether the mission has been narrowed from a proposal advanced by McChrystal in his August assessment of the war.” I thought, the President had addressed himself on this quite clearly at West Point, only, almost immediately to be corrected by SecDEF Bill Gates who, ex post Presidento, made the draw-down “conditions-based.” But for Iran, Presidents are not customarily publicly corrected by members of the Cabinet. Writes Mr. Chandrasekaran: “The result has been a wide divergence of expectations. Gates, appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press" the Sunday after the speech, said that perhaps only "some handful or some small number" would be withdrawn. Biden, during his MSNBC appearance last week, said a chart showing an increase in U.S. deployments this year would be "coming down as rapidly over the next two years."
Mr. Chandrasekaran writes, “The disagreements have opened a fault line between a desire for an early exit among several senior officials at the White House and a conviction among military commanders that victory is still achievable on their terms.” A term absent from the President’s thinking. While, a week after the President opted not to use the term, Mr. Gates is off to Kabul to proclaim, “we are in this thing to win.” Is is thus surprising that Mr. Chandrasekaran states, “the National Security Council is discussing ways to increase monitoring of military and State Department activities in Afghanistan to prevent "overreaching."
Mr. Chandrasekaran’s article in December would seem to confirm what I advised relevant parties on 7 October 2007, while the President was still said publicly to be deciding on the new strategy:
1. US troops in Afghanistan will be augmented. And it will be in the 30-40k range. . Which will be sold to the public as that which Gen McCrystal wanted, while it really isn’t exactly what he was asking for!!! On Afghanistan, President Obama will not fall behind President Bush on Iraq. In that, he is caught in the operant dynamic affecting all American war Presidents.
2. There will be no scaling back the Afghan war effort. NOT a term/ concept, which could not be sold to the Congressionals/ American public. Nonetheless, and I affirm my earlier message in this regard, the thrust/ primary objectives of the war SHALL change. QUIETLY. And where I speak of WH public affairs squaring circles, I reference that they will do what VEEP is advocating, while couching it in language more readily agreeable.
I had the privilege to be consulted integral to the review process. On 27 March 2009, I addressed the Inter-Agency-Working-Group at the State Department, stating: “My political friends, in both the Sunni insurgency and among the Shia militias, have warmly received the promise of the positive signal inherent in President Obama’s enlightened approach to their Freedom Struggle. Informed by both, the Indonesian and Kenyan Liberation struggles, the President’s quest, not to reform a corrupt system, but to build anew, incidentally abroad as at home, is encouraging. The Peoples of the World are encouraged to find that the President does not consider an enlightened humanism to define American exceptionalism, but the world's destiny. It is time to match the President’s rhetoric with goal-oriented action.”
The President did advance the agenda when, at West Point, declaring that in the struggle against entrenched authoritarian regimes “the United States will support movements of hope and history.” I do see potential for Taliban to rank among those movements of hope and history and do not share the view of those who view heightened clashes between Taliban and the U.S. Army inevitable. Just as, in January 2007, when President Bush announced the Iraq surge, I advised that there needed not be an inevitable Armageddon between the U.S. Army and the Jaish-al-Mehdi, subsequent to which I helped pave the way for the insertion of Iraqi and U.S. troops into Sadr City. Similar arrangements can be made in Afghanistan, if recent signaling is permitted to translate into motion en route to movement. I am encouraged to expect a conciliatory message from Mullah Omar in response to the President’s new approach.
I have myself for close to two years now been in direct contact with Taliban leadership, including Mullah Omar, whom I firmly believe, history will vindicate, just as history will vindicate the Hoyatoleslam Muqtadir al-Sadar. I have helped facilitate al-Sadr’s direct contact with Mullah Omar and arranged for their subsequent meeting in spring 2009. I am proud of this accomplishment, as I firmly believe that it is essential for the leaders of these “movements of hope and history” to meet to compare notes. I view this as essential to co-opting them in advance of reconciliation and their eventual reintegration into the political process.
As I said at State, “I disagree with the approach taken by the U.S. towards the Taliban. Don’t cultivate moderate elements of the Taliban. Instead, cultivate the most extreme elements of the Taliban, amenable to cultivating under terms you can live with, and then let them cultivate those uncultivateable for you. That, usually, results in their elimination.”
The U.S. approach to Taliban leadership remains ambiguous. Clearly, although the overall U.S. objective of the U.S. in Afghanistan is to annihilate al-Qaeda, the plan also calls to take on Taliban. The question, as to for what purpose: to annihilate, as well, or to make amenable to political compromise? I am encouraged to hold that the latter is the case, as I am pleased to note that the President has authorized informal but direct contact with Taliban leadership. I am further pleased to note that the Pakistan Government is encouraging the White House to reach out to Mullah Omar, directly.
Therefore, I have recommended to Mullah Omar to duplicate the President’s approach: to engage militarily, if forced to, but to engage politically, wherever feasible, the draw-down of U.S. forces providing an opportunity for Taliban to declare victory, presupposing the U.S. does not take five years to accomplish the task of complete withdrawal. The insertion of Pak Taliban forces into the Afghan theater, while simultaneously reaching out to both the U.S. and U.K. Governments should be seen in this context.
An understanding can be reached: Taliban can be swayed to lay down their weapons, as a prerequisite for their inclusion in the political process and return to government. Give them health, education, youth and religious affairs, while retaining the remainder of the public portfolio. They can be swayed to tone down their public posture and, following the Saudi/ Wahabi example, keep their excesses out of the Western spot light. Mullah Omar can retain the role of a sage on the margin of the political process, or fall victim to frailness. Past propositions for exile don’t strike his fancy.
It must be understood that for Taliban to demobilize as a military organization, as opposed to decommissioning their weapons, is a non-starter and a deal-breaker. “Peace through Strength” calls upon Taliban leadership to work for peace, while being prepared for war. Within this context, Sheik Nasrallah and Hezbollah continue to provide guide and counsel to all liberation movements.
President Karzai is interested in meeting with Taliban, but low- and medium-level. Ostensibly, so he claims, in order to weaken Mullah Omar from within, thus making him more amenable to subsequent overtures. The folly of President Karzai’s approach manifest in Taliban’s continued refusal to meet. My recommendation to the U.S. to overcome the road-block by direct contact with Mullah Omar. A quiet understanding between the White House and Mullah Omar now will lead the President’s approach to success, just as the Bush White House’s understanding with al-Sadr helped pave the way for aligning the Jaish-al-Mehdi with the U.S. Army, facilitating a withdrawal from Iraq under the fig leaf of battlefield success, while relinquishing the political to the Sadrist Movement. The U.K. Government, as usual, better equipped to handle this-type post-Colonial police intervention to pacify warring tribes in the far-flung corners of Empire, sharing the overall view that an accommodation with Taliban leadership is critical to mission success but, like the Americans, skeptical as to how much can be realistically achieved in the short time span given. The issue pending, as to whether to include a Taliban deputation in the London conference convened by PM Gordon Brown, which is hoped to help set the stage for a subsequent national reconciliation conference to be convened by President Karzai.
A critical issue, which remains to be squared: can Taliban be turned against Al Qaeda. In March, I told the IAWG: “I do not believe that in Afghanistan you will get Taliban to move against AQ. What would make you think they would, given that on many doctrinal issues Taliban is even more orthodox than AQ and certainly, between the two, the caliber of leadership is the greater in AQ. And they’re all inter-related. They will continue to be guided by common interest in destabilizing Pakistan. Any effort in Afghanistan, which addresses Taliban, but does not address AQ, is doomed to failure! Clearly, bin-Laden and Dr. Zawahiri will remain personas non-grata, awaiting Camry. But, a modus of infiltration must be found to co-opt the younger AQ leadership. Do you, honestly, believe in an all-out U.S. battlefield victory over AQ? I do not.”
Recent indications from Mullah Omar are helping change my assessment, presupposing that the U.S. offer is sufficiently enticing. He will address himself on this in his forthcoming message. I hold firm on the view that it is folly to attempt to separate rank and file from leadership.
The Administration is in the process of affecting a major strategic adjustment in the “Larger War,” moving the front from Iraq to Afghanistan. I am not a proponent of this move. The national U.S. interest is at stake in Iraq, because of continued U.S. reliance on affordable oil, Iraq’s potential juxtaposition in the ME and potential positioning contra Iran. … Vital U.S. national interests are not at stake in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a failed State and, like many States around the world, will remain a failed State for years to come. …Failure in Afghanistan will not adversely impact the United States. … Afghanistan is important, because we will not want to permit her, yet again, to provide safe heaven to AQ. But, if not welcome in Afghanistan, AQ will move to Sudan, Somalia, or a host of other countries. Therefore, if we do believe AQ to remain a direct threat to the U.S., let us make Afghanistan the decisive battleground, with the objective of AQ’s outright annihilation. That raises, again, the issue of capacity and intent. It also raises serious questions about strategy. …Certainly it would help pave the way for the smaller footprint, which is in the works, with an eye on Pakistan…. So I said in March.
Furthermore, I said, “I am not for a minute advocating for the United States to disengage. That would be a disaster. But, re-evaluate your priorities on the basis of (vital) national interest, upon which is dependent clear definitions of objectives over goals and fit your modalities to match your objectives, while building up your capacity. Not every crisis calls for U.S. action. That presupposes clarity of purpose, on the basis of which you must allocate the resources necessary to effect a major U.S. military expansion. Or, when that war standard has been hoisted, you will find yourself coming out short. Following 9/11, President Bush led you into battle on the cheap. Time is approaching for President Obama to mobilize the American people to the “Greater War” looming.” I am pleased to note that the President is continuing the process of re-evaluation.
1. Sheikh Ali al-Muthaba serves a Senior Commander of the Jaish al-Mehdi and is directed by Muqtadir al-Sadar to help draft the Taliban War Plan.
Unfortunately Said Bahaji was not found with his passport.



























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